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Hundreds of Tech Companies Want to Cash In on Homeland Security Funding. Here's Who They Are and What They're Selling.

Par : Dave Maass
8 juillet 2024 à 13:24

This post was co-written by EFF research intern Andrew Zuker.

Whenever government officials generate fear about the U.S.-Mexico border and immigration, they also generate dollars–hundreds of millions of dollars–for tech conglomerates and start-ups.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) today has released the U.S. Border-Homeland Security Technology Dataset, a multilayered dataset of the vendors who supply or market the technology for the U.S. government’s increasingly AI-powered homeland security efforts, including the so-called “virtual wall” of surveillance along the southern border with Mexico.

The four-part dataset includes a hand-curated directory that profiles more than 230 companies that manufacture, market or sell technology products and services, including DNA-testing, ground sensors, and counter-drone systems, to U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components engaged in border security and immigration enforcement. Vendors on this list are either verified federal contract holders, or have sought to do business with immigration/border authorities or local law enforcement along the border, through activities such as advertising homeland security products on their websites and exhibiting at border security conferences.

It features companies often in the spotlight, including Elbit Systems and Anduril Industries, but also lesser-known contractors, such as surveillance vendors Will-Burt Company and Benchmark. Many companies also supply the U.S. Department of Defense as part of the pipeline from battlefields to the borderlands.

The spreadsheet includes a separate list of 463 companies that have registered for Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement "Industry Day" events and a roster of 134 members of the DHS-founded Homeland Security Technology Consortium. Researchers will also find a compilation of the annual Top 100 contractors to DHS and its components dating back to 2006.

Download the dataset as an XLSX file through this link or access it as a Google Sheet (Google's Privacy Policy applies).

Border security and surveillance is a rapidly growing industry, fueled by the potential of massive congressional appropriations and accelerated by the promise of artificial intelligence. Of the 233 companies included in our initial survey, two-thirds promoted artificial intelligence, machine learning, or autonomous technology in their public-facing materials.

A heavy duty off-road vehicle with a surveillance camera at a border expo.

An HDT Global vehicle at the 2024 Border Security Expo. Source: Dugan Meyer (CC0 1.0 Universal)

Federal spending on homeland security has increased year over year, creating a lucrative market which has attracted investment from big tech and venture capital. Just last month, U.S. Rep. Mark Amodei, Chair of the House Appropriations Homeland Security Subcommittee, defended a funding package that included a "record-level" $300 million in funding for border security technology, including "autonomous surveillance towers; mobile surveillance platforms; counter-tunnel equipment, and a significant investment in counter-drone capability." 

This research project was made possible with internship support from the Heinrich Böll Foundation, in collaboration with EFF and the Reynolds School of Journalism at the University of Nevada, Reno.

Drew Mitnick of the Böll Foundation, who was also involved in building a similar data set of European vendors, says mapping the homeland security technology industry is essential to public debate. "We see the value of the project will be to better inform policymakers about the types of technology deployed, the privacy impact, the companies operating the technology, and the nature of their relationships with the agencies that operate the technology," he said.​

Information for this project was aggregated from a number of sources including press releases, business profile databases, vendor websites, social media, flyers and marketing materials, agency websites, defense industry publications, and the work of journalists, advocates, and watchdogs, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation and the student researchers who contribute to EFF’s Atlas of Surveillance. For our vendor profiles, we verified agency spending with each vendor using financial records available online through both the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS.gov), and USAspending.gov websites.

While many of the companies included have multiple divisions and offer a range of goods and services, this project is focused specifically on vendors who provide and market technology, communications, and IT capabilities for DHSsub-agencies, including CBP, ICE and Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS). We have also included companies that sell to other agencies operating at the border, such as the Drug Enforcement Administration and state and local law enforcement agencies engaged in border enforcement.

The data is organized by vendor and includes information on the type of technology or services they offer, the vendor’s participation in specific federal border security initiatives, procurement records, the company's website, parent companies and related subsidiaries, specific surveillance products offered, and which federal agencies they serve. Additional links and supporting documents have been included throughout. We have also provided links to scans of promotional materials distributed at border security conferences.

This dataset serves as a snapshot of the homeland security industry. While we set out to be exhaustive, we discovered the corporate landscape is murky with acquisitions, mergers, holding companies, and sub-sub-contractors that often intentionally obscure the connections between the various enterprises attempting to rake in lucrative government contracts. We hope that by providing a multilayered view, this data will serve as a definitive resource for journalists, academics, advocates of privacy and human rights, and policymakers. 

This work should be the starting point for further investigation—such as Freedom of Information Act requests and political influence analysis—into the companies and agencies rapidly expanding and automating surveillance and immigration enforcement, whether the aim is to challenge a political narrative or to hold authorities and the industry accountable.

If you use this data in your own research or have information that would further enrich the dataset, we'd love to hear from you at aos@eff.org.

New ALPR Vulnerabilities Prove Mass Surveillance Is a Public Safety Threat

Government officials across the U.S. frequently promote the supposed, and often anecdotal, public safety benefits of automated license plate readers (ALPRs), but rarely do they examine how this very same technology poses risks to public safety that may outweigh the crimes they are attempting to address in the first place. When law enforcement uses ALPRs to document the comings and goings of every driver on the road, regardless of a nexus to a crime, it results in gargantuan databases of sensitive information, and few agencies are equipped, staffed, or trained to harden their systems against quickly evolving cybersecurity threats.

The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), a component of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, released an advisory last week that should be a wake up call to the thousands of local government agencies around the country that use ALPRs to surveil the travel patterns of their residents by scanning their license plates and "fingerprinting" their vehicles. The bulletin outlines seven vulnerabilities in Motorola Solutions' Vigilant ALPRs, including missing encryption and insufficiently protected credentials.

To give a sense of the scale of the data collected with ALPRs, EFF found that just 80 agencies in California using primarily Vigilant technology, collected more than 1.6 billion license plate scans (CSV) in 2022. This data can be used to track people in real time, identify their "pattern of life," and even identify their relations and associates. An EFF analysis from 2021 found that 99.9% of this data is unrelated to any public safety interest when it's collected. If accessed by malicious parties, the information could be used to harass, stalk, or even extort innocent people.

Unlike location data a person shares with, say, GPS-based navigation app Waze, ALPRs collect and store this information without consent and there is very little a person can do to have this information purged from these systems. And while a person can turn off their phone if they are engaging in a sensitive activity, such as visiting a reproductive health facility or attending a protest, tampering with your license plate is a crime in many jurisdictions. Because drivers don't have control over ALPR data, the onus for protecting the data lies with the police and sheriffs who operate the surveillance and the vendors that provide the technology.

It's a general tenet of cybersecurity that you should not collect and retain more personal data than you are capable of protecting. Perhaps ironically, a Motorola Solutions cybersecurity specialist wrote an article in Police Chief magazine this month that  public safety agencies "are often challenged when it comes to recruiting and retaining experienced cybersecurity personnel," even though "the potential for harm from external factors is substantial." 

That partially explains why, more than 125 law enforcement agencies reported a data breach or cyberattacks between 2012 and 2020, according to research by former EFF intern Madison Vialpando. The Motorola Solutions article claims that ransomware attacks "targeting U.S. public safety organizations increased by 142 percent" in 2023.

Yet, the temptation to "collect it all" continues to overshadow the responsibility to "protect it all." What makes the latest CISA disclosure even more outrageous is it is at least the third time in the last decade that major security vulnerabilities have been found in ALPRs.

In 2015, building off the previous works of University of Arizona researchers, EFF published an investigation that found more than 100 ALPR cameras in Louisiana, California and Florida were connected unsecured to the internet, many with publicly accessible websites that anyone could use to manipulate the controls of the cameras or siphon off data. Just by visiting a URL, a malicious actor, without any specialized knowledge, could view live feeds of the cameras, including one that could be used to spy on college students at the University of Southern California. Some of the agencies involved fixed the problem after being alerted about that problem. However, 3M, which had recently bought the ALPR manufacturer PIPS Technology (which has since been sold to Neology), claimed zero responsibility for the problem, saying instead that it was the agencies' responsibility to manage the devices' cybersecurity. "The security features are clearly explained in our packaging," they wrote. Four years later, TechCrunch found that the problem still persisted.

In 2019, Customs & Border Protections' vendor providing ALPR technology for Border Patrol checkpoints was breached, with hackers gaining access to 105,000 license plate images, as well as more than 184,000 images of travelers from a face recognition pilot program. Some of those images made it onto the dark web, according to reporting by journalist Joseph Cox.

If there's one positive thing we can say about the latest Vigilant vulnerability disclosures, it's that for once a government agency identified and reported the vulnerabilities before they could do damage. The initial discovery was made by the Michigan State Police Michigan Cyber Command Center, which passed the information onto CISA, which then worked with Motorola Solutions to address the problems.

The Michigan Cyber Command center found a total of seven vulnerabilities in Vigilant devices; two of which were medium severity and 5 of which were high severity vulnerabilities.

One of the most severe vulnerabilities (given a score of 8.6 out of 10,) was that every camera sold by Motorola had a wifi network turned on by default that used the same hardcoded password as every other camera, meaning that if someone was able to find the password to connect to one camera they could connect to any other camera as long as they were near it.

Someone with physical access to the camera could also easily install a backdoor, which would allow them access to the camera even if the wifi was turned off. An attacker could even log into the system locally using a default username and password. Once they connected to that camera they would be able to see live video and control the camera, even disable it. Or they could view historic recordings of license plate data stored without any kind of encryption. They would also see logs containing authentication information which could be used to connect to a back-end server where more information is stored. Motorola claims that they have mitigated all of these vulnerabilities.

When vulnerabilities are found, it's not enough for them be patched: They must be used as a stark warnings for policy makers and the courts. Following EFF's report in 2015, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal spiked a statewide ALPR program, writing in his veto message:

Camera programs such as these that make private information readily available beyond the scope of law enforcement, pose a fundamental risk to personal privacy and create large pools of information belonging to law abiding citizens that unfortunately can be extremely vulnerable to theft or misuse.

In May, a Norfolk Circuit Court Judge reached the same conclusion, writing in an order suppressing the data collected by ALPRs in a criminal case:

The Court cannot ignore the possibility of a potential hacking incident either. For example, a team of computer scientists at the University of Arizona was able to find vulnerable ALPR cameras in Washington, California, Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida, Virginia, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. (Italics added for emphasis.) … The citizens of Norfolk may be concerned to learn the extent to which the Norfolk Police Department is tracking and maintaining a database of their every movement for 30 days. The Defendant argues “what we have is a dragnet over the entire city” retained for a month and the Court agrees.

But a data breach isn't the only way that ALPR data can be leaked or abused. In 2022, an officer in the Kechi (Kansas) Police Department accessed ALPR data shared with his department by the Wichita Police Department to stalk his wife. Meanwhile, recently the Orrville (Ohio) Police Department released a driver's raw ALPR scans to a total stranger in response to a public records request, 404 Media reported.

Public safety agencies must resist the allure of marketing materials promising surveillance omniscience, and instead collect only the data they need for actual criminal investigations. They must never store more data than they adequately protect within their limited resources–or they must keep the public safe from data breaches by not collecting the data at all.

Coalition to Calexico: Think Twice About Reapproving Border Surveillance Tower Next to a Public Park

Par : Dave Maass
14 mai 2024 à 16:23

Update May 15, 2024: The letter has been updated to include support from the Southern Border Communities Coalition. It was re-sent to the Calexico City Council. 

On the southwest side of Calexico, a border town in California’s Imperial Valley, a surveillance tower casts a shadow over a baseball field and a residential neighborhood. In 2000, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (the precursor to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)) leased the corner of Nosotros Park from the city for $1 a year for the tower. But now the lease has expired, and DHS component Customs & Border Protection (CBP) would like the city to re-up the deal 

Map of Nosotros park with location of tower

But times—and technology—have changed. CBP’s new strategy calls for adopting powerful artificial intelligence technology to not only control the towers, but to scan, track and categorize everything they see.  

Now, privacy and social justice advocates including the Imperial Valley Equity and Justice Coalition, American Friends Service Committee, Calexico Needs Change, and Southern Border Communities Coalition have joined EFF in sending the city council a letter urging them to not sign the lease and either spike the project or renegotiate it to ensure that civil liberties and human rights are protected.  

The groups write 

The Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS) tower at Nosotros Park was installed in the early 2000s when video technology was fairly limited and the feeds required real-time monitoring by human personnel. That is not how these cameras will operate under CBP's new AI strategy. Instead, these towers will be controlled by algorithms that will autonomously detect, identify, track and classify objects of interest. This means that everything that falls under the gaze of the cameras will be scanned and categorized. To an extent, the AI will autonomously decide what to monitor and recommend when Border Patrol officers should be dispatched. While a human being may be able to tell the difference between children playing games or residents getting ready for work, AI is prone to mistakes and difficult to hold accountable. 

In an era where the public has grave concerns on the impact of unchecked technology on youth and communities of color, we do not believe enough scrutiny and skepticism has been applied to this agreement and CBP's proposal. For example, the item contains very little in terms of describing what kinds of data will be collected, how long it will be stored, and what measures will be taken to mitigate the potential threats to privacy and human rights. 

The letter also notes that CBP’s tower programs have repeatedly failed to achieve the promised outcomes. In fact, the DHS Inspector General found that the early 2000s program,yielded few apprehensions as a percentage of detection, resulted in needless investigations of legitimate activity, and consumed valuable staff time to perform video analysis or investigate sensor alerts.”  

The groups are calling for Calexico to press pause on the lease agreement until CBP can answer a list of questions about the impact of the surveillance tower on privacy and human rights. Should the city council insist on going forward, they should at least require regular briefings on any new technologies connected to the tower and the ability to cancel the lease on much shorter notice than the 365 days currently spelled out in the proposed contract.  

Add Bluetooth to the Long List of Border Surveillance Technologies

A new report from news outlet NOTUS shows that at least two Texas counties along the U.S.-Mexico border have purchased a product that would allow law enforcement to track devices that emit Bluetooth signals, including cell phones, smartwatches, wireless earbuds, and car entertainment systems. This incredibly personal model of tracking is the latest level of surveillance infrastructure along the U.S.-Mexico border—where communities are not only exposed to a tremendous amount of constant monitoring, but also serves as a laboratory where law enforcement agencies at all levels of government test new technologies.

The product now being deployed in Texas, called TraffiCatch, can detect wifi and Bluetooth signals in moving cars to track them. Webb County, which includes Laredo, has had TraffiCatch technology since at least 2019, according to GovSpend procurement data. Val Verde County, which includes Del Rio, approved the technology in 2022. 

This data collection is possible because all Bluetooth devices regularly broadcast a Bluetooth Device Address. This address can be either a public address or a random address. Public addresses don’t change for the lifetime of the device, making them the easiest to track. Random addresses are more common and have multiple levels of privacy, but for the most part change regularly (this is the case with most modern smartphones and products like AirTags.) Bluetooth products with random addresses would be hard to track for a device that hasn’t paired with them. But if the tracked person is also carrying a Bluetooth device that has a public address, or if tracking devices are placed close to each other so a device is seen multiple times before it changes its address, random addresses could be correlated with that person over long periods of time.

It is unclear whether TraffiCatch is doing this sort of advanced analysis and correlation, and how effective it would be at tracking most modern Bluetooth devices.

According to TraffiCatch’s manufacturer, Jenoptik, this data derived from Bluetooth is also combined with data collected from automated license plate readers, another form of vehicle tracking technology placed along roads and highways by federal, state, and local law enforcement throughout the Texas border. ALPRs are well understood technology for vehicle tracking, but the addition of Bluetooth tracking may allow law enforcement to track individuals even if they are using different vehicles.

This mirrors what we already know about how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has been using cell-site simulators (CSSs). Also known as Stingrays or IMSI catchers, CSS are devices that masquerade as legitimate cell-phone towers, tricking phones within a certain radius into connecting to the device rather than a tower. In 2023, the Department of Homeland Security’s Inspector General released a troubling report detailing how federal agencies like ICE, its subcomponent Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the Secret Service have conducted surveillance using CSSs without proper authorization and in violation of the law. Specifically, the Inspector General found that these agencies did not adhere to federal privacy policy governing the use of CSS and failed to obtain special orders required before using these types of surveillance devices.

Law enforcement agencies along the border can pour money into overlapping systems of surveillance that monitor entire communities living along the border thanks in part to Operation Stonegarden (OPSG), a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) grant program, which rewards state and local police for collaborating in border security initiatives. DHS doled out $90 million in OPSG funding in 2023, $37 million of which went to Texas agencies. These programs are especially alarming to human rights advocates due to recent legislation passed in Texas to allow local and state law enforcement to take immigration enforcement into their own hands.

As a ubiquitous wireless interface to many of our personal devices and even our vehicles, Bluetooth is a large and notoriously insecure attack surface for hacks and exploits. And as TraffiCatch demonstrates, even when your device’s Bluetooth tech isn’t being actively hacked, it can broadcast uniquely identifiable information that make you a target for tracking. This is one in the many ways surveillance, and the distrust it breeds in the public over technology and tech companies, hinders progress. Hands-free communication in cars is a fantastic modern innovation. But the fact that it comes at the cost of opening a whole society up to surveillance is a detriment to all.

Virtual Reality and the 'Virtual Wall'

Par : Dave Maass
10 avril 2024 à 18:32

When EFF set out to map surveillance technology along the U.S.-Mexico border, we weren't exactly sure how to do it. We started with public records—procurement documents, environmental assessments, and the like—which allowed us to find the GPS coordinates of scores of towers. During a series of in-person trips, we were able to find even more. Yet virtual reality ended up being one of the key tools in not only discovering surveillance at the border, but also in educating people about Customs & Border Protection's so-called "virtual wall" through VR tours.

EFF Director of Investigations Dave Maass recently gave a lightning talk at University of Nevada, Reno's annual XR Meetup explaining how virtual reality, perhaps ironically, has allowed us to better understand the reality of border surveillance.

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"Infrastructures of Control": Q&A with the Geographers Behind University of Arizona's Border Surveillance Photo Exhibition

Par : Dave Maass
5 avril 2024 à 15:50

Guided by EFF's map of Customs & Border Protection surveillance towers, University of Arizona geographers Colter Thomas and Dugan Meyer have been methodologically traversing the U.S.-Mexico border and photographing the infrastructure that comprises the so-called "virtual wall."

An amrored vehicle next to a surveillance tower along the Rio Grande River

Anduril Sentry tower beside the Rio Grande River. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

From April 12-26, their outdoor exhibition "Infrastructures of Control" will be on display on the University of Arizona campus in Tucson, featuring more than 30 photographs of surveillance technology, a replica surveillance tower, and a blow up map based on EFF's data.

Locals can join the researchers and EFF staff for an opening night tour at 5pm on April 12, followed by an EFF Speakeasy/Meetup. There will also be a panel discussion at 5pm on April 19, moderated by journalist Yael Grauer, co-author of EFF's Street-Level Surveillance hub. It will feature a variety of experts on the border, including Isaac Esposto (No More Deaths), Dora Rodriguez (Salvavision), Pedro De Velasco (Kino Border Initiative), Todd Miller (The Border Chronicle), and Daniel Torres (Daniel Torres Reports).

In the meantime, we chatted with Colter and Dugan about what their project means to them.

MAASS: Tell us what you hope people will take away from this project?

MEYER: We think of our work as a way for us to contribute to a broader movement for border justice that has been alive and well in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands for decades. Using photography, mapping, and other forms of research, we are trying to make the constantly expanding infrastructure of U.S. border policing and surveillance more visible to public audiences everywhere. Our hope is that doing so will prompt more expansive and critical discussions about the extent to which these infrastructures are reshaping the social and environmental landscapes throughout this region and beyond.

THOMAS: The diversity of landscapes that make up the borderlands can make it hard to see how these parts fit together, but the common thread of surveillance is an ominous sign for the future and we hope that the work we make can encourage people from different places and experiences to find common cause for looking critically at these infrastructures and what they mean for the future of the borderlands.

A surveillance tower in a valley.

An Integrated Fixed Tower in Southern Arizona. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

MAASS: So much is written about border surveillance by researchers working off documents, without seeing these towers first hand. How did your real-world exploration affect your understanding of border technology?

THOMAS: Personally I’m left with more questions than answers when doing this fieldwork. We have driven along the border from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific, and it is surprising just how much variation there is within this broad system of U.S. border security. It can sometimes seem like there isn’t just one border at all, but instead a patchwork of infrastructural parts—technologies, architecture, policy, etc.—that only looks cohesive from a distance.

A surveillance tower on a hill

An Integrated Fixed Tower in Southern Arizona. Photo by Colter Thomas (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0)

MAASS: That makes me think of Trevor Paglen, an artist known for his work documenting surveillance programs. He often talks about the invisibility of surveillance technology. Is that also what you encountered?

MEYER: The scale and scope of U.S. border policing is dizzying, and much of how this system functions is hidden from view. But we think many viewers of this exhibition might be surprised—as we were when we started doing this work—just how much of this infrastructure is hidden in plain sight, integrated into daily life in communities of all kinds.

This is one of the classic characteristics of infrastructure: when it is working as intended, it often seems to recede into the background of life, taken for granted as though it always existed and couldn’t be otherwise. But these systems, from surveillance programs to the border itself, require tremendous amounts of labor and resources to function, and when you look closely, it is much easier to see the waste and brutality that are their real legacy. As Colter and I do this kind of looking, I often think about a line from the late David Graeber, who wrote that “the ultimate hidden truth of the world is that it is something that we make, and could just as easily make differently.”

THOMAS: Like Dugan said, infrastructure rarely draws direct attention. As artists and researchers, then, our challenge has been to find a way to disrupt this banality visually, to literally reframe the material landscapes of surveillance in ways that sort of pull this infrastructure back into focus. We aren’t trying to make this infrastructure beautiful, but we are trying to present it in a way that people will look at it more closely. I think this is also what makes Paglen’s work so powerful—it aims for something more than simply documenting or archiving a subject that has thus far escaped scrutiny. Like Paglen, we are trying to present our audiences with images that demand attention, and to contextualize those images in ways that open up opportunities and spaces for viewers to act collectively with their attention. For us, this means collaborating with a range of other people and organizations—like the EFF—to invite viewers into critical conversations that are already happening about what these technologies and infrastructures mean for ourselves and our neighbors, wherever they are coming from.

The Foilies 2024

Recognizing the worst in government transparency.

The Foilies are co-written by EFF and MuckRock and published in alternative newspapers around the country through a partnership with the Association of Alternative Newsmedia

We're taught in school about checks and balances between the various branches of government, but those lessons tend to leave out the role that civilians play in holding officials accountable. We're not just talking about the ballot box, but the everyday power we all have to demand government agencies make their records and data available to public scrutiny.

At every level of government in the United States (and often in other countries), there are laws that empower the public to file requests for public records. They go by various names—Freedom of Information, Right-to-Know, Open Records, or even Sunshine laws—but all share the general concept that because the government is of the people, its documents belong to the people. You don't need to be a lawyer or journalist to file these; you just have to care.

It's easy to feel powerless in these times, as local newsrooms close, and elected officials embrace disinformation as a standard political tool. But here's what you can do, and we promise it'll make you feel better: Pick a local agency—it could be a city council, a sheriff's office or state department of natural resources—and send them an email demanding their public record-request log, or any other record showing what requests they receive, how long it took them to respond, whether they turned over records, and how much they charged the requester for copies. Many agencies even have an online portal that makes it easier, or you can use MuckRock’s records request tool. (You can also explore other people's results that have been published on MuckRock's FOIA Log Explorer.) That will send the message to local leaders they're on notice. You may even uncover an egregious pattern of ignoring or willfully violating the law.

The Foilies are our attempt to call out these violations each year during Sunshine Week, an annual event (March 10-16 this year) when advocacy groups, news organizations and citizen watchdogs combine efforts to highlight the importance of government transparency laws. The Electronic Frontier Foundation and MuckRock, in partnership with the Association of Alternative Newsmedia, compile the year's worst and most ridiculous responses to public records requests and other attempts to thwart public access to information, including through increasing attempts to gut the laws guaranteeing this access—and we issue these agencies and officials tongue-in-cheek "awards" for their failures.

Sometimes, these awards actually make a difference. Last year, Mendocino County in California repealed its policy of charging illegal public records fees after local journalists and activists used The Foilies’ "The Transparency Tax Award" in their advocacy against the rule.

This year marks our 10th annual accounting of ridiculous redactions, outrageous copying fees, and retaliatory attacks on requesters—and we have some doozies for the ages.

The "Winners"

The Not-So-Magic Word Award: Augusta County Sheriff’s Office, Va.

Public records laws exist in no small part because corruption, inefficiency and other malfeasance happen, regardless of the size of the government. The public’s right to hold these entities accountable through transparency can prevent waste and fraud.

Of course, this kind of oversight can be very inconvenient to those who would like a bit of secrecy. Employees in Virginia’s Augusta County thought they’d found a neat trick for foiling Virginia's Freedom of Information Act.

Consider: “NO FOIA”

In an attempt to withhold a bunch of emails they wanted to hide from the public eye, employees in Augusta County began tagging their messages with “NO FOIA,” as an apparent incantation staff believed could ward off transparency. Of course, there are no magical words that allow officials to evade transparency laws; the laws assume all government records are public, so agencies can’t just say they don’t want records released.

Fortunately, at least one county employee thought that breaking the law must be a little more complicated than that, and this person went to Breaking Through News to blow the whistle.

Breaking Through News sent a FOIA request for those “NO FOIA” emails. The outlet received just 140 emails of the 1,212 that the county indicated were responsive, and those released records highlighted the county’s highly suspect approach to withholding public records. Among the released records were materials like the wages for the Sheriff Office employees (clearly a public record), the overtime rates (clearly a public record) and a letter from the sheriff deriding the competitive wages being offered at other county departments (embarrassing but still clearly a public record). 

Other clearly public records, according to a local court, included recordings of executive sessions that the commissioners had entered illegally, which Breaking Through News learned about through the released records. They teamed up with the Augusta Free Press to sue for access to the recordings, a suit they won last month. They still haven’t received the awarded records, and it’s possible that Augusta County will appeal. Still, it turned out that, thanks to the efforts of local journalists, their misguided attempt to conjure a culture of “No FOIA” in August County actually brought them more scrutiny and accountability.

The Poop and Pasta Award: Richlands, Va.
Spaghetti noodles spilling out of a mailbox.

Government officials retaliated against a public records requester by filling her mailbox with noodles.

In 2020, Laura Mollo of Richlands, Va., discovered that the county 911 center could not dispatch Richlands residents’ emergency calls: While the center dispatched all other county 911 calls, calls from Richlands had to be transferred to the Richlands Police Department to be handled. After the Richlands Town Council dismissed Mollo’s concerns, she began requesting records under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act. The records showed that Richlands residents faced lengthy delays in connecting with local emergency services. On one call, a woman pleaded for help for her husband, only to be told that county dispatch couldn’t do anything—and her husband died during the delay. Other records Mollo obtained showed that Richlands appeared to be misusing its resources.

You would hope that public officials would be grateful that Mollo uncovered the town’s inadequate emergency response system and budget mismanagement. Well, not exactly: Mollo endured a campaign of intimidation and harassment for holding the government accountable. Mollo describes how her mailbox was stuffed with cow manure on one occasion, and spaghetti on another (which Mollo understood to be an insult to her husband’s Italian heritage). A town contractor harassed her at her home; police pulled her over; and Richlands officials even had a special prosecutor investigate her.

But this story has a happy ending: In November 2022, Mollo was elected to the Richlands Town Council. The records she uncovered led Richlands to change over to the county 911 center, which now dispatches Richlands residents’ calls. And in 2023, the Virginia Coalition for Open Government recognized Mollo by awarding her the Laurence E. Richardson Citizen Award for Open Government. Mollo’s recognition is well-deserved. Our communities are indebted to people like her who vindicate our right to public records, especially when they face such inexcusable harassment for their efforts.

The Error 404 Transparency Not Found Award: FOIAonline

In 2012, FOIAonline was launched with much fanfare as a way to bring federal transparency into the late 20th century. No longer would requesters have to mail or fax requests. Instead, FOIAonline was a consolidated starting point, managed by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), that let you file Freedom of Information Act requests with numerous federal entities from within a single digital interface.

Even better, the results of requests would be available online, meaning that if someone else asked for interesting information, it would be available to everyone, potentially reducing the number of duplicate requests. It was a good idea—but it was marred from the beginning by uneven uptake, agency infighting, and inscrutable design decisions that created endless headaches. In its latter years, FOIAonline would go down for days or weeks at a time without explanation. The portal saw agency after agency ditch the platform in favor of either homegrown solutions or third-party vendors.

Last year, the EPA announced that the grand experiment was being shuttered, leaving thousands of requesters uncertain about how and where to follow up on their open requests, and unceremoniously deleting millions of documents from public access without any indication of whether they would be made available again.

In a very on-brand twist of the knife, the decision to sunset FOIAonline was actually made two years prior, after an EPA office reported in a presentation that the service was likely to enter a “financial death spiral” of rising costs and reduced agency usage. Meanwhile, civil-society organizations such as MuckRock, the Project on Government Oversight, and the Internet Archive have worked to resuscitate and make available at least some of the documents the site used to host.

The Literary Judicial Thrashing of the Year Award: Pennridge, Penn., School District

Sometimes when you're caught breaking the law, the judge will throw the book at you. In the case of Pennridge School District in Bucks County, Penn. Judge Jordan B. Yeager catapulted an entire shelf of banned books at administrators for violating the state's Right-to-Know Law.

The case begins with Darren Laustsen, a local parent who was alarmed by a new policy to restrict access to books that deal with “sexualized content,” seemingly in lockstep with book-censorship laws happening around the country. Searching the school library's catalog, he came across a strange trend: Certain controversial books that appeared on other challenged-book lists had been checked out for a year or more. Since students are only allowed to check out books for a week, he (correctly) suspected that library staff were checking them out themselves to block access.

So he filed a public records request for all books checked out by non-students. Now, it's generally important for library patrons to have their privacy protected when it comes to the books they read—but it's a different story if public employees are checking out books as part of their official duties and effectively enabling censorship. The district withheld the records, provided incomplete information, and even went so far as to return books and re-check them out under a student's account in order to obscure the truth. And so Laustsen sued.

The judge issued a scathing and literarily robust ruling: “In short, the district altered the records that were the subject of the request, thwarted public access to public information, and effectuated a cover-up of faculty, administrators, and other non-students’ removal of books from Pennridge High School’s library shelves." The opinion was peppered with witty quotes from historically banned books, including Nineteen Eighty-Four, Alice in Wonderland, The Art of Racing in the Rain and To Kill a Mockingbird. After enumerating the district's claims that later proved to be inaccurate, he cited Kurt Vonnegut's infamous catchphrase from Slaughterhouse-Five: "So it goes."

The Photographic Recall Award: Los Angeles Police Department

Police agencies seem to love nothing more than trumpeting an arrest with an accompanying mugshot—but when the tables are turned, and it’s the cops’ headshots being disclosed, they seem to lose their minds and all sense of the First Amendment.

This unconstitutional escapade began (and is still going) after a reporter and police watchdog published headshots of Los Angeles Police Department officers, which they lawfully obtained via a public records lawsuit. LAPD cops and their union were furious. The city then sued the reporter, Ben Camacho, and the Stop LAPD Spying Coalition, demanding that they remove the headshots from the internet and return the records to LAPD.

You read that right: After a settlement in a public records lawsuit required the city to disclose the headshots, officials turned around and sued the requester for, uh, disclosing those same records, because the city claimed it accidentally released pictures of undercover cops.

But it gets worse: Last fall, a trial court denied a motion to throw out the city’s case seeking to claw back the images; Camacho and the coalition have appealed that decision and have not taken the images offline. And in February, the LAPD sought to hold Camacho and the coalition liable for damages it may face in a separate lawsuit brought against it by hundreds of police officers whose headshots were disclosed.

We’re short on space, but we’ll try explain the myriad ways in which all of the above is flagrantly unconstitutional: The First Amendment protects Camacho and the coalition’s ability to publish public records they lawfully obtained, prohibits courts from entering prior restraints that stop protected speech, and limits the LAPD’s ability to make them pay for any mistakes the city made in disclosing the headshots. Los Angeles officials should be ashamed of themselves—but their conduct shows that they apparently have no shame.

The Cops Anonymous Award: Chesterfield County Police Department, Va.

The Chesterfield County Police Department in Virginia refused to disclose the names of hundreds of police officers to a public records requester on this theory: Because the cops might at some point go undercover, the public could never learn their identities. It’s not at all dystopian to claim that a public law enforcement agency needs to have secret police!

Other police agencies throughout the state seem to deploy similar secrecy tactics, too.

The Keep Your Opinions to Yourself Award: Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita

In March 2023, Indiana Attorney General Todd Rokita sent a letter to medical providers across the state demanding information about the types of gender-affirming care they may provide to young Hoosiers. But this was no unbiased probe: Rokita made his position very clear when he publicly blasted these health services as “the sterilization of vulnerable children” that “could legitimately be considered child abuse.” He made claims to the media that the clinics’ main goals weren’t to support vulnerable youth, but to rake in cash.

Yet as loud as he was about his views in the press, Rokita was suddenly tight-lipped once the nonprofit organization American Oversight filed a public records request asking for all the research, analyses and other documentation that he used to support his claims. Although his agency located 85 documents that were relevant to their request, Rokita refused to release a single page, citing a legal exception that allows him to withhold deliberative documents that are “expressions of opinion or are of a speculative nature.”

Perhaps if Rokita’s opinions on gender-affirming care weren't based on facts, he should've kept those opinions and speculations to himself in the first place.

The Failed Sunshine State Award: Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis

Florida’s Sunshine Law is known as one of the strongest in the nation, but Gov. Ron DeSantis spent much of 2023 working, pretty successfully, to undermine its superlative status with a slew of bills designed to weaken public transparency and journalism.

In March, DeSantis was happy to sign a bill to withhold all records related to travel done by the governor and a whole cast of characters. The law went into effect just more than a week before the governor announced his presidential bid. In addition, DeSantis has asserted his “executive privilege” to block the release of public records in a move that, according to experts like media law professor Catherine Cameron, is unprecedented in Florida’s history of transparency.

DeSantis suspended his presidential campaign in January. That may affect how many trips he’ll be taking out-of-state in the coming months, but it won’t undo the damage of his Sunshine-slashing policies.

Multiple active lawsuits are challenging DeSantis over his handling of Sunshine Law requests. In one, The Washington Post is challenging the constitutionality of withholding the governor’s travel records. In that case, a Florida Department of Law Enforcement official last month claimed the governor had delayed the release of his travel records. Nonprofit watchdog group American Oversight filed a lawsuit in February, challenging “the unjustified and unlawful delay” in responding to requests, citing a dozen records requests to the governor’s office that have been pending for one to three years.

“It’s stunning, the amount of material that has been taken off the table from a state that many have considered to be the most transparent,” Michael Barfield, director of public access for the Florida Center for Government Accountability (FCGA), told NBC News. The FCGA is now suing the governor’s office for records on flights of migrants to Massachusetts. “We’ve quickly become one of the least transparent in the space of four years.”

The Self-Serving Special Session Award: Arkansas Gov. Sarah Huckabee Sanders

By design, FOIA laws exist to help the people who pay taxes hold the people who spend those taxes accountable. In Arkansas, as in many states, taxpayer money funds most government functions: daily office operations, schools, travel, dinners, security, etc. As Arkansas’ governor, Sarah Huckabee Sanders has flown all over the country, accompanied by members of her family and the Arkansas State Police. For the ASP alone, the people of Arkansas paid $1.4 million in the last half of last year.

Last year, Sanders seemed to tire of the scrutiny being paid to her office and her spending. Sanders cited her family’s safety as she tried to shutter any attempts to see her travel records, taking the unusual step of calling a special session of the state Legislature to protect herself from the menace of transparency.

Notably, the governor had also recently been implicated in an Arkansas Freedom of Information Act case for these kinds of records.

The attempt to gut the law included a laundry list of carve-outs unrelated to safety, such as walking back the ability of public-records plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees when they win their case. Other attempts to scale back Arkansas' FOIA earlier in the year had not passed, and the state attorney general’s office was already working to study what improvements could be made to the law.  

Fortunately, the people of Arkansas came out to support the principle of government transparency, even as their governor decided she shouldn’t need to deal with it anymore. Over a tense few days, dozens of Arkansans lined up to testify in defense of the state FOIA and the value of holding elected officials, like Sanders, accountable to the people.

By the time the session wound down, the state Legislature had gone through multiple revisions. The sponsors walked back most of the extreme asks and added a requirement for the Arkansas State Police to provide quarterly reports on some of the governor’s travel costs. However, other details of that travel, like companions and the size of the security team, ultimately became exempt. Sanders managed to twist the whole fiasco into a win, though it would be a great surprise if the Legislature didn’t reconvene this year with some fresh attempts to take a bite out of FOIA.

While such a blatant attempt to bash public transparency is certainly a loser move, it clearly earns Sanders a win in the FOILIES—and the distinction of being one of the least transparent government officials this year.

The Doobie-ous Redaction Award: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and Drug Enforcement Administration
A cannabis leaf covered with black bar redactions.

The feds heavily redacted an email about reclassifying cannabis from a Schedule I to a Schedule III substance.

Bloomberg reporters got a major scoop when they wrote about a Health and Human Services memo detailing how health officials were considering major changes to the federal restrictions on marijuana, recommending reclassifying it from a Schedule I substance to Schedule III.

Currently, the Schedule I classification for marijuana puts it in the same league as heroin and LSD, while Schedule III classification would indicate lower potential for harm and addiction along with valid medical applications.

Since Bloomberg viewed but didn’t publish the memo itself, reporters from the Cannabis Business Times filed a FOIA request to get the document into the public record. Their request was met with limited success: HHS provided a copy of the letter, but redacted virtually the entire document besides the salutation and contact information. When pressed further by CBT reporters, the DEA and HHS would only confirm what the redacted documents had already revealed—virtually nothing.

HHS handed over the full, 250-page review several months later, after a lawsuit was filed by an attorney in Texas. The crucial information the agencies had fought so hard to protect: “Based on my review of the evidence and the FDA’s recommendation, it is my recommendation as the Assistant Secretary for Health that marijuana should be placed in Schedule III of the CSA.”

The “Clearly Releasable,” Clearly Nonsense Award: U.S. Air Force

Increasingly, federal and state government agencies require public records requesters to submit their requests through online portals. It’s not uncommon for these portals to be quite lacking. For example, some portals fail to provide space to include information crucial to requests.

But the Air Force deserves special recognition for the changes it made to its submission portal, which asked requesters if they would  agree to limit their requests to  information that the Air Force deemed "clearly releasable.” You might think, “surely the Air Force defined this vague ‘clearly releasable’ information.” Alas, you’d be wrong: The form stated only that requesters would “agree to accept any information that will be withheld in compliance with the principles of FOIA exemptions as a full release.” In other words, the Air Force asked requesters to give up the fight over information before it even began, and to accept the Air Force's redactions and rejections as non-negotiable.

Following criticism, the Air Force jettisoned the update to its portal to undo these changes. Moving forward, it's "clear" that it should aim higher when it comes to transparency.

The Scrubbed Scrubs Award: Ontario Ministry of Health, Canada

Upon taking office in 2018, Ontario Premier Doug Ford was determined to shake up the Canadian province’s healthcare system. His administration has been a bit more tight-lipped, however, about the results of that invasive procedure. Under Ford, Ontario’s Ministry of Health is fighting the release of information on how understaffed the province’s medical system is, citing “economic and other interests.” The government’s own report, partially released to Global News, details high attrition as well as “chronic shortages” of nurses.

The reporters’ attempts to find out exactly how understaffed the system is, however, were met with black-bar redactions. The government claims that releasing the information would negatively impact “negotiating contracts with health-care workers.” However, the refusal to release the information hasn’t helped solve the problem; instead, it’s left the public in the dark about the extent of the issue and what it would actually cost to address it.

Global News has appealed the withholdings. That process has dragged on for over a year, but a decision is expected soon.

The Judicial Blindfold Award: Mississippi Justice Courts

Courts are usually transparent by default. People can walk in to watch hearings and trials, and can get access to court records online or at the court clerk’s office. And there are often court rules or state laws that ensure courts are public.

Apparently, the majority of Mississippi Justice Courts don’t feel like following those rules. An investigation by ProPublica and the Northeast Mississippi Daily Journal found that nearly two-thirds of these county-level courts obstructed public access to basic information about law enforcement’s execution of search warrants. This blockade not only appeared to violate state rules on court access; it frustrated the public’s ability to scrutinize when police officers raid someone’s home without knocking and announcing themselves.

The good news is that the Daily Journal is pushing back. It filed suit in the justice court in Union County, Miss., and asked for an end to the practice of never making search-warrant materials public.

Mississippi courts are unfortunately not alone in their efforts to keep search warrant records secret. The San Bernardino Superior Court of California sought to keep secret search warrants used to engage in invasive digital surveillance, only disclosing most of them after the EFF sued.

It’s My Party and I Can Hide Records If I Want to Award: Wyoming Department of Education

Does the public really have a right to know if their tax dollars pay for a private political event?

Former Superintendent of Public Instruction Brian Schroeder and Chief Communications Officer Linda Finnerty in the Wyoming Department of Education didn’t seem to think so, according to Laramie County Judge Steven Sharpe.

Sharpe, in his order requiring disclosure of the records, wrote that the two were more concerned with “covering the agency’s tracks” and acted in “bad faith” in complying with Wyoming’s state open records law.

The lawsuit proved that Schroeder originally used public money for a "Stop the Sexualization of Our Children" event and provided misleading statements to the plaintiffs about the source of funding for the private, pro-book-banning event.

The former superintendent had also failed to provide texts and emails sent via personal devices that were related to the planning of the event, ignoring the advice of the state’s attorneys. Instead, Schroeder decided to “shop around” for legal advice and listen to a friend, private attorney Drake Hill, who told him to not provide his cell phone for inspection.

Meanwhile, Finnerty and the Wyoming Department of Education “did not attempt to locate financial documents responsive to plaintiffs’ request, even though Finnerty knew or certainly should have known such records existed.”

Transparency won this round with the disclosure of more than 1,500 text messages and emails—and according to Sharpe, the incident established a legal precedent on Wyoming public records access.

The Fee-l the Burn Award: Baltimore Police Department

In 2020, Open Justice Baltimore sued the Baltimore Police Department over the agency's demand that the nonprofit watchdog group pay more than $1 million to obtain copies of use-of-force investigation files. 

The police department had decreased their assessment to $245,000 by the time of the lawsuit, but it rejected the nonprofit’s fee waiver, questioning the public interest in the records and where they would change the public's understanding of the issue. The agency also claimed that fulfilling the request would be costly and burdensome for its short-staffed police department.

In 2023, Maryland’s Supreme Court issued a sizzling decision criticizing the BPD’s $245,000 fee assessment and its refusal to waive that fee in the name of public interest. The Supreme Court found that the public interest in how the department polices itself was clear and that the department should have considered how a denial of the fee waiver would “exacerbate the public controversy” and further “the perception that BPD has something to hide.”

The Supreme Court called BPD’s fee assessment “arbitrary and capricious” and remanded the case back to the police department, which must now reconsider the fee waiver. The unanimous decision from the state’s highest court did not mince its words on the cost of public records, either: “While an official custodian’s discretion in these matters is broad,” the opinion reads, “it is not boundless.”

The Continuing Failure Award: United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

Alien registration files, also commonly known as “A-Files,” contain crucial information about a non-citizen’s interaction with immigration agencies, and are central to determining eligibility for immigration benefits.

However, U.S. immigration agencies have routinely failed to release alien files within the statutory time limit for responding, according to Nightingale et al v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services et al, a class-action lawsuit by a group of immigration attorneys and individual requesters.

The attorneys filed suit in 2019 against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, the Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement. In 2020, Judge William H. Orrick ruled that the agencies must respond to FOIA requests within 20 business days, and provide the court and class counsel with quarterly compliance reports. The case remains open.

With U.S. immigration courts containing a backlog of more than 2 million cases as of October of last year, according to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the path to citizenship is bogged down for many applicants. The failure of immigration agencies to comply with statutory deadlines for requests only makes navigating the immigration system even more challenging. There is reason for hope for applicants, however. In 2022, Attorney General Merrick Garland made it federal policy to not require FOIA requests for copies of immigration proceedings, instead encouraging agencies to make records more readily accessible through other means.

Even the A-File backlog itself is improving. In the last status report, filed by the Department of Justice, they wrote that “of the approximately 119,140 new A-File requests received in the current reporting period, approximately 82,582 were completed, and approximately 81,980 were timely completed.”

The Creative Invoicing Award: Richmond, Va., Police Department
A redacted document with an expensive price tag attached.

Some agencies claim outrageous fees for redacting documents to deter public access.

OpenOversightVA requested copies of general procedures—the basic outline of how police departments run—from localities across Virginia. While many departments either publicly posted them or provided them at no charge, Richmond Police responded with a $7,873.14 invoice. That’s $52.14 an hour to spend one hour on “review, and, if necessary, redaction” on each of the department’s 151 procedures.

This Foilies “winner” was chosen because of the wide gap between how available the information should be, and the staggering cost to bring it out of the file cabinet.

As MuckRock’s agency tracking shows, this is hardly an aberration for the agency. But this estimated invoice came not long after the department’s tear-gassing of protesters in 2020 cost the city almost $700,000. At a time when other departments are opening their most basic rulebooks (in California, for example, every law enforcement agency is required to post these policy manuals online), Richmond has been caught attempting to use a simple FOIA request as a cash cow.

The Foilies (Creative Commons Attribution License) were compiled by the Electronic Frontier Foundation (Director of Investigations Dave Maass, Senior Staff Attorney Aaron Mackey, Legal Fellow Brendan Gilligan, Investigative Researcher Beryl Lipton) and MuckRock (Co-Founder Michael Morisy, Data Reporter Dillon Bergin, Engagement Journalist Kelly Kauffman, and Contributor Tom Nash), with further review and editing by Shawn Musgrave. Illustrations are by EFF Designer Hannah Diaz. The Foilies are published in partnership with the Association of Alternative Newsmedia. 

The Atlas of Surveillance Removes Ring, Adds Third-Party Investigative Platforms

Running the Atlas of Surveillance, our project to map and inventory police surveillance across the United States, means experiencing emotional extremes.

Whenever we announce that we've added new data points to the Atlas, it comes with a great sense of satisfaction. That's because it almost always means that we're hundreds or even thousands of steps closer to achieving what only a few years ago would've seemed impossible: comprehensively documenting the surveillance state through our partnership with students at the University of Nevada, Reno Reynolds School of Journalism.

At the same time, it's depressing as hell. That's because it also reflects how quickly and dangerously the surveillance technology is metastasizing.

We have the exact opposite feeling when we remove items from the Atlas of Surveillance. It's a little sad to see our numbers drop, but at the same time that change in data usually means that a city or county has eliminated a surveillance program.

That brings us to the biggest change in the Atlas since our launch in 2018. This week, we removed 2,530 data points: an entire category of surveillance. With the announcement from Amazon that its home surveillance company Ring will no longer facilitate warrantless requests for consumer video footage, we've decided to sunset that particular dataset.

While law enforcement agencies still maintain accounts on Ring's Neighbors social network, it seems to serve as a communications tool, a function on par with services like Nixle and Citizen, which we currently don't capture in the Atlas. That's not to say law enforcement won't be gathering footage from Ring cameras: they will, through legal process or by directly asking residents to give them access via the Fusus platform. But that type of surveillance doesn't result from merely having a Neighbors account (agencies without accounts can use these methods to obtain footage), which was what our data documented. You can still find out which agencies are maintaining camera registries through the Atlas. 

Ring's decision was a huge victory – and the exact outcome EFF and other civil liberties groups were hoping for. It also has opened up our capacity to track other surveillance technologies growing in use by law enforcement. If we were going to remove a category, we decided we should add one too.

Atlas of Surveillance users will now see a new type of technology: Third-Party Investigative Platforms, or TPIPs. Commons TPIP products include Thomson Reuters CLEAR, LexisNexis Accurint Virtual Crime Center, TransUnion TLOxp, and SoundThinking CrimeTracer (formerly Coplink X from Forensic Logic). These are technologies we've been watching for awhile, but have been struggling to categorize and define. But here's the definition we've come up with:

Third-Party Investigative Platforms are cloud-based software systems that law enforcement agencies subscribe to in order to access, share, mine, and analyze various sources of investigative data. Some of the data the agencies upload themselves, but the systems also provide access to data from other law enforcement, as well as from commercial sources and data brokers. Many products offer AI features, such as pattern identification, face recognition, and predictive analytics. Some agencies employ multiple TPIPs.

We are calling this new category a beta feature in the Atlas, since we are still figuring out how best to research and compile this data nationwide. You'll find fairly comprehensive data on the use of CrimeTracer in Tennessee and Massachusetts, because both states provide the software to local law enforcement agencies throughout the state. Similarly, we've got a large dataset for the use of the Accurint Virtual Crime Center in Colorado, due to a statewide contract. (Big thanks to Prof. Ran Duan's Data Journalism students for working with us to compile those lists!) We've also added more than 60 other agencies around the country, and we expect that dataset to grow as we hone our research methods.

If you've got information on the use of TPIPs in your area, don't hesitate to reach out. You can email us at aos@eff.org, submit a tip through our online form, or file a public records request using the template that EFF and our students have developed to reveal the use of these platforms. 

A Virtual Reality Tour of Surveillance Tech at the Border: A Conversation with Dave Maass of the Electronic Frontier Foundation

Par : Dave Maass
4 mars 2024 à 12:13

This interview is crossposted from The Markup, a nonprofit news organization that investigates technology and its impact on society.

By: Monique O. Madan, Investigative Reporter at The Markup

After reading my daily news stories amid his declining health, my grandfather made it a habit of traveling the world—all from his desk and wheelchair. When I went on trips, he always had strong opinions and recommendations for me, as if he’d already been there. “I've traveled to hundreds of countries," he would tell me. "It's called Google Earth. Today, I’m going to Armenia.” My Abuelo’s passion for teleporting via Google Street View has always been one of my fondest memories and has never left me. 

So naturally, when I found out that Dave Maass of the Electronic Frontier Foundation gave virtual reality tours of surveillance technology along the U.S.–Mexico border, I had to make it happen. I cover technology at the intersection of immigration, criminal justice, social justice and government accountability, and Maass’ tour aligns with my work as I investigate border surveillance. 

My journey began in a small, quiet, conference room at the Homestead Cybrarium, a hybrid virtual public library where I checked out virtual reality gear. The moment I slid the headset onto my face and the tour started, I was transported to a beach in San Diego. An hour and a half later, I had traveled across 1,500 miles worth of towns and deserts and ended up in Brownsville, Texas.

During that time, we looked at surveillance technology in 27 different cities on both sides of the border. Some of the tech I saw were autonomous towers, aerostat blimps, sky towers, automated license plate readers, and border checkpoints. 

After the excursion, I talked with Maass, a former journalist, about the experience. Our conversation has been edited for brevity and clarity.

Monique O. Madan: You began by dropping me in San Diego, California, and it was intense. Tell me why you chose the location to start this experience.

Dave Maass: So I typically start the tour in San Diego for two reasons. One is because it is the westernmost part of the border, so it's a natural place to start. But more importantly, it is such a stark contrast to be able to jump from one side to the other, from the San Diego side to the Tijuana side.

When you're in San Diego, you're in this very militarized park that's totally empty, with patrol vehicles and this very fierce-looking wall and a giant surveillance tower over your head. You can really get a sense of the scale.

And once you're used to that, I jump you to the other side of the wall. You're able to suddenly see how it's party time in Tijuana, how they painted the wall, and how there are restaurants and food stands and people playing on the beach and there are all these Instagram moments.

A surveillance tower overlooks the border fence

Credit: Electronic Frontier Foundation

Yet on the other side is the American militarized border, you know, essentially spying on everybody who's just going about their lives on the Mexican side.

It also serves as a way to show the power of VR. If there were no wall, you could walk that in a minute. But because of the border wall, you've got to go all the way to the border crossing, and then come all the way back. And we're talking, potentially, hours for you to be able to go that distance. 

Madan: I felt like I was in two different places, but it was really the same place, just feet away from each other. We saw remote video surveillance systems, relocatable ones. We saw integrated fixed towers, autonomous surveillance towers, sky towers, aerostat radar systems, and then covert automated license plate readers. How do you get the average person to digest what all these things really mean?

7 Stops on Dave Maass’ Virtual Reality Surveillance Tour of the U.S.–Mexico Border

The following links take you to Google Street View.

Maass: Me and some colleagues at EFF, we were looking at how we could use virtual reality to help people understand surveillance. We came up with a very basic game called “Spot the Surveillance,” where you could put on a headset and it puts you in one location with a 360-degree camera view. We took a photo of a corner in San Francisco that already had a lot of surveillance, but we also Photoshopped in other pieces of surveillance. The idea was for people to look around and try to find the surveillance.

When they found one, it would ping, and it would tell you what the technology could do. And we found that that helped people learn to look around their environment for these technologies, to understand it. So it gave people a better idea of how we exist in the environment differently than if they were shown a picture or a PowerPoint presentation that was like, “This is what a license plate reader looks like. This is what a drone looks like.”

That is why when we're on the southern border tour, there are certain places where I don't point the technology out to you. I ask you to look around and see if you can find it yourself.

Sometimes I start with one where it's overhead because people are looking around. They're pointing to a radio tower, pointing to something else. It takes them a while before they actually look up in the sky and see there's this giant spy mob over their head. But, yeah, one of the other ones is these license plate readers that are hidden in traffic cones. People don't notice them there because they're just these traffic cones that are so ubiquitous along highways and streets that they don't actually think about it.

Madan: People have the impression that surveillance ops are only in militarized settings. Can you talk to me about whether that’s true?

Maass: Certainly there are towers in the middle of the desert. Certainly there are towers that are in remote or rural areas. But there are just so many that are in urban areas, from big cities to small towns.

Rather than just a close-up picture of a tower, once you actually see one and you're able to look at where the cameras are pointed, you start to see things like towers that are able to look into people's back windows, and towers that are able to look into people's backyards, and whole communities that are going to have glimpses over their neighborhood all the time.

But so rarely in the conversation is the impact on the communities that live on both the U.S. and Mexican side of the border, and who are just there all the time trying to get by and have, you know, the normal dream of prospering and raising a family.

Madan: What does this mean from a privacy, human rights, and civil liberties standpoint? 

Maass: There’s not a lot of transparency around issues of technology. That is one of the major flaws, both for human rights and civil liberties, but it's also a flaw for those who believe that technology is going to address whatever amorphous problem they've identified or failed to identify with border security and migration. So it's hard to know when this is being abused and how.

But what we can say is that as [the government] is applying more artificial intelligence to its camera system, it's able to document the pattern of life of people who live along the border.

It may be capturing people and learning where they work and where they're worshiping or who they are associated with. So you can imagine that if you are somebody who lives in that community and if you're living in that community your whole life, the government may have, by the time you're 31 years old, your entire driving history on file that somebody can access at any time, with who knows what safeguards are in place.

But beyond all that, it really normalizes surveillance for a whole community.

There are a lot of psychological studies out there about how surveillance can affect people over time, affect their behavior, and affect their perceptions of a society. That's one of the other things I worry about: What kind of psychological trauma is surveillance causing for these communities over the long term, in ways that may not be immediately perceptible?

Madan: One of the most interesting uses of experiencing this tour via the VR technology was being able to pause and observe every single detail at the border checkpoint.

Maass: Most people are just rolling through, and so you don't get to notice all of the different elements of a checkpoint. But because the Google Street View car went through, we can roll through it at our leisure and point out different things. I have a series of checkpoints that I go through with people, show them this is where the license plate reader is, this is where the scanner truck is, here's the first surveillance camera, here's the second surveillance camera. We can see the body-worn camera on this particular officer. Here's where people are searched. Here's where they're detained. Here's where their car is rolled through an X-ray machine.

Madan: So your team has been mapping border surveillance for a while. Tell us about that and how it fits into this experience.

Maass: We started mapping out the towers in 2022, but we had started researching and building a database of at least the amount of surveillance towers by district in 2019. 

I don't think it was apparent to anyone until we started mapping these out, how concentrated towers are in populated areas. Maybe if you were in one of those populated areas, you knew about it, or maybe you didn't.

In the long haul, it may start to tell a little bit more about border policy in general and whether any of these are having any kind of impact, and maybe we start to learn more about apprehensions and other kinds of data that we can connect to.

Madan: If someone wanted to take a tour like this, if they wanted to hop on in VR and visit a few of these places, how can they do that? 

Maass: So if they have a VR headset, a Meta Quest 2 or newer, the Wander app is what you're going to use. You can just go into the app and position yourself somewhere in the border. Jump around a little bit, maybe it will be like five feet, and you can start seeing a surveillance tower.

If you don’t have a headset and want to do it in your browser, you can go to EFF’s map and click on a tower. You’ll see a Street View link when you scroll down. Or you can use those tower coordinates and then go to your VR headset and try to find it.

Madan: What are your thoughts about the Meta Quest headset—formerly known as the Oculus Rift—being founded by Palmer Luckey, who also founded the company that made one of the towers on the tour?

Maass: There’s certainly some irony about using a technology that was championed by Palmer Luckey to shine light on another technology championed by Palmer Luckey. That's not the only tech irony, of course: Wander [the app used for the tour] also depends on using products from Google and Meta, both of whom continue to contribute to the rise of surveillance in society, to investigate surveillance.

Madan: What's your biggest takeaway as the person giving this tour?

Maass: I am a researcher and educator, and an activist and communicator. To me, this is one of the most impactful ways that I can reach people and give them a meaningful experience about the border. 

I think that when people are consuming information about the border, they're just getting little snippets from a little particular area. You know, it's always a little place that they're getting a little sliver of what's going on. 

But when we're able to do this with VR, I'm able to take them everywhere. I'm able to take them to both sides of the border. We're able to see a whole lot, and they're able to come away by the end of it, feeling like they were there. Like your brain starts filling in the blanks. People get this experience that they wouldn't be able to get any other way.

Being able to linger over these spaces on my own time showed me just how much surveillance is truly embedded in people's daily lives. When I left the library, I found myself inspecting traffic cones for license plate readers. 

As I continue to investigate border surveillance, this experience really showed me just how educational these tools can be for academics, research and journalism. 

Thanks for reading,
Monique
Investigative Reporter
The Markup

This article was originally published on The Markup and was republished under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license.

The Atlas of Surveillance Hits Major Milestones: 2023 in Review

28 décembre 2023 à 11:24

"The EFF are relentless."

That's what a New York Police Department lieutenant wrote on LinkedIn after someone sent him a link to the Atlas of Surveillance, EFF's moonshot effort to document which U.S. law enforcement agencies are using which technologies, including drones, automated license plate readers and face recognition. Of course, the lieutenant then went on to attack us with unsubstantiated accusations of misinformation — but we take it all as a compliment.

If you haven't checked out the Atlas of Surveillance recently, or ever before, you absolutely should. It includes a searchable database and an interactive map, and anyone can download the data for their own projects. As this collaboration with the University of Nevada Reno's Reynolds School of Journalism (RSJ) finishes its fifth year, we are proud to announce that we've hit a major milestone: more than 12,000 data points that document the use of police surveillance nationwide, all collected using open-source investigative techniques, data journalism, and public records requests.

We’ve come a long way since the Atlas of Surveillance launched as a pilot project with RSJ back in the spring semester of 2019. By that summer, with the help of a few dozen journalism students, we had accumulated 250 data points, focused on the 23 counties along the U.S.-Mexico border. When we launched the formal website in 2020, we had collected a little more than 5,500 data points. Today's dataset represents more than a 100% increase since then.

That isn't the only major milestone we accomplished this year. To collect data for the project, EFF and RSJ designed a tool called Report Back, which allows us to distribute micro-research assignments (about 10-20 minutes each) to students in our classes. This winter, the 3,000th assignment was completed using Report Back.

This year we also dug into one particular technology. As part of our Atlas efforts, we began to see Fusus—a company working to bring real-time surveillance to local police departments via camera registries and real-time crime centers—appear more frequently as a tool used by law enforcement. In collaboration with the Thomson Reuters Foundation, we decided to do a deeper dive into the adoption of Fusus, and the Atlas has served as a resource for other reporters working to investigate this company in their own towns and across the country.

We’re proud to have built the Atlas because it’s meant to be a tool for the public, and we're excited to see more and more people are discovering it. This year, we clocked about 250,000 pageviews, more than double what we've seen in previous years. This tells us not only that more people care about police surveillance than ever before, but that we're better able to inform them about what's happening locally in their communities. The top 20 jurisdictions with the most traffic for include:

  1. Phoenix, Ariz.
  2. Chicago, Ill.
  3. Los Angeles, Calif.
  4. Atlanta, Ga.
  5. New York City, N.Y.
  6. Austin, Texas
  7. Houston, Texas
  8. San Antonio, Texas
  9. Seattle, Wash.
  10. Columbus, Ohio  
  11. Las Vegas, Nev.
  12. Dallas, Texas
  13. Philadelphia, Penn.
  14. Denver, Colo. 
  15. Tampa, Fla.
  16. West Bloomfield, Mich.
  17. Portland, Ore.
  18. San Diego, Calif.
  19. Nashville, Tenn.
  20. Pittsburgh, Penn. 

One of the primary goals of the Atlas of Surveillance project is to reach journalists, academics, activists, and policymakers, so they can use our data to better inform their research. In this sense, 2023 was a huge success. Here are some of our favorite projects that used Atlas of Surveillance data this year:

  • Social justice advocates were trained on how to use the Atlas of Surveillance in a workshop titled "Data Brokers & Modern Surveillance: Dangers for Marginalized People" at an annual Friends (Quakers) conference. 
  • A team of master’s students at the University of Amsterdam built a website called "Beyond the Lens" that analyzes the police surveillance industry using primary data from the Atlas of Surveillance. 
  • The Markup combined Atlas data with census data, crime data, and emails obtained through the California Public Records Act to investigate the Los Angeles Police Department's relationship with Ring, Amazon's home video surveillance subsidiary. 

The Atlas has also been cited in government proceedings and court briefs:

The Atlas made appearances in many academic and legal scholarship publications in 2023, including:

Meanwhile, print, radio, and television journalists continue to turn to the Atlas as a resource, either to build stories about police surveillance or provide context. This year, these have included:

Activists, advocates, and concerned citizens around the nation have also used the Atlas of Surveillance to support their actions against expansion of surveillance:

These victories wouldn't be possible without the students at RSJ, especially our 2023 interns Haley Ekberg, Kieran Dazzo, Dez Peltzer, and Colin Brandes. We also owe thanks to lecturers Paro Pain, Ran Duan, Jim Scripps, and Patrick File for sharing their classrooms with us.

In 2024, EFF will expand the Atlas to capture more technologies used by law enforcement agencies. We are also planning new features, functions and fixes that allow users to better browse and analyze the data.  And of course, you should keep an eye out in the new year for new workshops, talks, and other opportunities to learn more and get involved with the project.

This blog is part of our Year in Review series. Read other articles about the fight for digital rights in 2023.

VICTORY! California Department of Justice Declares Out-of-State Sharing of License Plate Data Unlawful

California Attorney General Rob Bonta has issued a legal interpretation and guidance for law enforcement agencies around the state that confirms what privacy advocates have been saying for years: It is against the law for police to share data collected from license plate readers with out-of-state or federal agencies. This is an important victory for immigrants, abortion seekers, protesters, and everyone else who drives a car, as our movements expose intimate details about where we’ve been and what we’ve been doing.

Automated license plate readers (ALPRs) are cameras that capture the movements of vehicles and upload the location of the vehicles to a searchable, shareable database. Law enforcement often installs these devices on fixed locations, such as street lights, as well as on patrol vehicles that are used to canvass neighborhoods. It is a mass surveillance technology that collects data on everyone. In fact, EFF research has found that more than 99.9% of the data collected is unconnected to any crime or other public safety interest.

The California State legislature passed SB 34 in 2015 to require basic safeguards for the use of ALPRs. These include a prohibition on California agencies from sharing data with non-California agencies. They also include the publication of a usage policy that is consistent with civil liberties and privacy.

As EFF and other groups such as the ACLU of California, MuckRock News, and the Center for Human Rights and Privacy have demonstrated over and over again through public records requests, many California agencies have either ignored or defied these policies, putting Californians at risk. In some cases, agencies have shared data with hundreds of out-of-state agencies (including in states with abortion restrictions) and with federal agencies (such as U.S. Customs & Border Protection and U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement). This surveillance is especially threatening to vulnerable populations, such as migrants and abortion seekers, whose rights are protected in California but not recognized by other states or the federal government.

In 2019, EFF successfully lobbied the legislature to order the California State Auditor to investigate the use of ALPR. The resulting report came out in 2020, with damning findings that agencies were flagrantly violating the law. While state lawmakers have introduced legislation to address the findings, so far no bill has passed. In the absence of new legislative action, Attorney General Bonta's new memo, grounded in SB 34, serves as canon for how local agencies should treat ALPR data.

The bulletin comes after EFF and the California ACLU affiliates sued the Marin County Sheriff in 2021, because his agency was violating SB 34 by sending its ALPR data to federal agencies including ICE and CBP. The case was favorably settled.

Attorney General Bonta’s guidance also follows new advocacy by these groups earlier this year. Along with the ACLU of Northern California and the ACLU of Southern California, EFF released public records from more than 70 law enforcement agencies in California that showed they were sharing data with states that have enacted abortion restrictions. We sent letters to each of the agencies demanding they end the sharing immediately. Dozens complied. Some disagreed with our determination, but nonetheless agreed to pursue new policies to protect abortion access.

Now California’s top law enforcement officer has determined that out-of-state data sharing is illegal and has drafted a model policy. Every agency in California must follow Attorney General Bonta's guidance, review their data sharing, and cut off every out-of-state and federal agency.

Or better yet, they could end their ALPR program altogether.

The State of Chihuahua Is Building a 20-Story Tower in Ciudad Juarez to Surveil 13 Cities–and Texas Will Also Be Watching

EFF Special Advisor Paul Tepper and EFF intern Michael Rubio contributed research to this report.

Chihuahua state officials and a notorious Mexican security contractor broke ground last summer on the Torre Centinela (Sentinel Tower), an ominous, 20-story high-rise in downtown Ciudad Juarez that will serve as the central node of a new AI-enhanced surveillance regime. With tentacles reaching into 13 Mexican cities and a data pipeline that will channel intelligence all the way to Austin, Texas, the monstrous project will be unlike anything seen before along the U.S.-Mexico border.

And that's saying a lot, considering the last 30-plus years of surging technology on the U.S side of the border. 

The Torre Centinela will stand in a former parking lot next to the city's famous bullring, a mere half-mile south of where migrants and asylum seekers have camped and protested at the Paso del Norte International Bridge leading to El Paso. But its reach goes much further: the Torre Centinela is just one piece of the Plataforma Centinela (Sentinel Platform), an aggressive new technology strategy developed by Chihuahua's Secretaria de Seguridad Pública Estatal (Secretary of State Public Security or SSPE) in collaboration with the company Seguritech.

With its sprawling infrastructure, the Plataforma Centinela will create an atmosphere of surveillance and data-streams blanketing the entire region. The plan calls for nearly every cutting-edge technology system marketed at law enforcement: 10,000 surveillance cameras, face recognition, automated license plate recognition, real-time crime analytics, a fleet of mobile surveillance vehicles, drone teams and counter-drone teams, and more.

If the project comes together as advertised in the Avengers-style trailer that SSPE released to influence public opinion, law enforcement personnel on site will be surrounded by wall-to-wall monitors (140 meters of screens per floor), while 2,000 officers in the field will be able to access live intelligence through handheld tablets.

Texas law enforcement will also have "eyes on this side of the border" via the Plataforma Centinela, Chihuahua Governor Maru Campos publicly stated last year. Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed a memorandum of understanding confirming the partnership.

Plataforma Centinela will transform public life and threaten human rights in the borderlands in ways that aren't easy to assess. Regional newspapers and local advocates–especially Norte Digital and Frente Político Ciudadano para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos (FPCDDH)--have raised significant concerns about the project, pointing to a low likelihood of success and high potential for waste and abuse.

"It is a myopic approach to security; the full emphasis is placed on situational prevention, while the social causes of crime and violence are not addressed," FPCDDH member and analyst Victor M. Quintana tells EFF, noting that the Plataforma Centinela's budget is significantly higher than what the state devotes to social services. "There are no strategies for the prevention of addiction, neither for rebuilding the fabric of society nor attending to dropouts from school or young people at risk, which are social causes of insecurity."

Instead of providing access to unfiltered information about the project, the State of Chihuahua has launched a public relations blitz. In addition to press conferences and the highly-produced cinematic trailer, SSPE recently hosted a "Pabellón Centinel" (Sentinel Pavillion), a family-friendly carnival where the public was invited to check out a camera wall and drones, while children played with paintball guns, drove a toy ATV patrol vehicle around a model city, and colored in illustrations of a data center operator.

Behind that smoke screen, state officials are doing almost everything they can to control the narrative around the project and avoid public scrutiny.

According to news reports, the SSPE and the Secretaría de Hacienda (Finance Secretary) have simultaneously deemed most information about the project as classified and left dozens of public records requests unanswered. The Chihuahua State Congress also rejected a proposal to formally declassify the documents and stymied other oversight measures, including a proposed audit. Meanwhile, EFF has submitted public records requests to several Texas agencies and all have claimed they have no records related to the Plataforma Centinela.

This is all the more troubling considering the relationship between the state and Seguritech, a company whose business practices in 22 other jurisdictions have been called into question by public officials.

What we can be sure of is that the Plataforma Centinela project may serve as proof of concept of the kind of panopticon surveillance governments can get away with in both North America and Latin America.

What Is the Plataforma Centinela?

High-tech surveillance centers are not a new phenomenon on the Mexican side of the border. These facilities tend to use "C" distinctions to explain their functions and purposes. EFF has mapped out dozens of these in the six Mexican border states.

A screen capture of a Google Map of Mexican C-Centers

Click to explore the map. Google's Privacy Policy applies.

They include:

  • C4 (Centro de Comunicación, Cómputo, Control y Comando) (Center for Communications, Calculation, Control, and Command), 
  • C5 (Centro de Coordinación Integral, de Control, Comando, Comunicación y Cómputo del Estado) (Center for Integral Coordination for Control, Command, Communications, and State Calculation), 
  • C5i (Centro de Control, Comando, Comunicación, Cómputo, Coordinación e Inteligencia) (Center for Control, Command, Communication, Calculation, Coordination and Intelligence).

Typically, these centers focus as a cross between a 911 call center and a real-time crime center, with operators handling emergency calls, analyzing crime data, and controlling a network of surveillance cameras via a wall bank of monitors. In some cases, the Cs may be presented in different order or stand for slightly different words. For example, some C5s might alternately stand for "Centros de Comando, Control, Comunicación, Cómputo y Calidad" (Centers for Command, Control, Communication, Computation and Quality). These facilities also exist in other parts of Mexico. The number of Cs often indicate scale and responsibilities, but more often than not, it seems to be a political or marketing designation.

The Plataforma Centinela however, goes far beyond the scope of previous projects and in fact will be known as the first C7 (Centro de Comando, Cómputo, Control, Coordinación, Contacto Ciudadano, Calidad, Comunicaciones e Inteligencia Artificial) (Center for Command, Calculation, Control, Coordination, Citizen Contact, Quality, Communications and Artificial Intelligence). The Torre Centinela in Ciudad Juarez will serve as the nerve center, with more than a dozen sub-centers throughout the state. 

According to statistics that Gov. Campos disclosed as part of negotiations with Texas and news reports, the Plataforma Centinela will include: 

    • 1,791 automated license plate readers. These are cameras that photograph vehicles and their license plates, then upload that data along with the time and location where the vehicles were seen to a massive searchable database. Law enforcement can also create lists of license plates to track specific vehicles and receive alerts when those vehicles are seen. 
    • 4,800 fixed cameras. These are your run-of-the-mill cameras, positioned to permanently surveil a particular location from one angle.  
    • 3,065 pan-tilt-zoom (PTZ) cameras. These are more sophisticated cameras. While they are affixed to a specific location, such as a street light or a telephone pole, these cameras can be controlled remotely. An operator can swivel the camera around 360-degrees and zoom in on subjects. 
    • 2,000 tablets. Officers in the field will be issued handheld devices for accessing data directly from the Plataforma Centinela
    • 102 security arches. This is a common form of surveillance in Mexico, but not the United States. These are structures built over highways and roads to capture data on passing vehicles and their passengers. 
    • 74 drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles/UAVs). While the Chihuahua government has not disclosed what surveillance payload will be attached to these drones, it is common for law enforcement drones to deploy video, infrared, and thermal imaging technology.
    • 40 mobile video surveillance trailers. While details on these systems are scant, it is likely these are camera towers that can be towed to and parked at targeted locations. 
    • 15 anti-drone systems. These systems are designed to intercept and disable drones operated by criminal organizations.
    • Face recognition. The project calls for the application of "biometric filters" to be applied to camera feeds "to assist in the capture of cartel leaders," and the collection of migrant biometrics. Such a system would require scanning the faces of the general public.
    • Artificial intelligence. So far, the administration has thrown around the term AI without fully explaining how it will be used. However, typically law enforcement agencies have used this technology to "predict" where crime might occur, identify individuals mostly likely to be connected to crime, and to surface potential connections between suspects that would not have been obvious to a human observer. However, all these technologies have a propensity for making errors or exacerbating existing bias. 

As of May, 60% of the Plataforma Centinela camera network had been installed, with an expected completion date of December, according to Norte Digital. However, the cameras were already being used in criminal investigations. 

All combined, this technology amounts to an unprecedented expansion of the surveillance state in Latin America, as SSPE brags in its promotional material. The threat to privacy may also be unprecedented: creating cities where people can no longer move freely in their communities without being watched, scanned, and tagged.

But that's assuming the system functions as advertised—and based on the main contractor's history, that's anything but guaranteed. 

Who Is Seguritech?

The Plataforma Centinela project is being built by the megacorporation Seguritech, which has signed deals with more than a dozen government entities throughout Mexico. As of 2018, the company received no-bid contracts in at least 10 Mexican states and cities, which means it was able to sidestep the accountability process that requires companies to compete for projects.

And when it comes to the Plataforma Centinela, the company isn't simply a contractor: It will actually have ownership over the project, the Torre Centinela, and all its related assets, including cameras and drones, until August 2027.

That's what SSPE Secretary Gilberto Loya Chávez told the news organization Norte Digital, but the terms of the agreement between Seguritech and Chihuahua's administration are not public. The SSPE's Transparency Committee decided to classify the information "concerning the procedures for the acquisition of supplies, goods, and technology necessary for the development, implementation, and operation of the Platforma Centinela" for five years.

In spite of the opacity shrouding the project, journalists have surfaced some information about the investment plan. According to statements from government officials, the Plataforma Centinela will cost 4.2 billion pesos, with Chihuahua's administration paying regular installments to the company every three months (Chihuahua's governor had previously said that these would be yearly payments in the amount of 700 million to 1 billion pesos per year). According to news reports, when the payments are completed in 2027, the ownership of the platform's assets and infrastructure are expected to pass from Seguritech to the state of Chihuahua.

The Plataforma Centinela project marks a new pinnacle in Seguritech's trajectory as a Mexican security contractor. Founded in 1995 as a small business selling neighborhood alarms, SeguriTech Privada S.A de C.V. became a highly profitable brand, and currently operates in five areas: security, defense, telecommunications, aeronautics, and construction. According to Zeta Tijuana, Seguritech also secures contracts through its affiliated companies, including Comunicación Segura (focused on telecommunications and security) and Picorp S.A. de C.V. (focused on architecture and construction, including prisons and detention centers). Zeta also identified another SecuriTech company, Tres10 de C.V., as the contractor named in various C5i projects.

Thorough reporting by Mexican outlets such as Proceso, Zeta Tijuana, Norte Digital, and Zona Free paint an unsettling picture of Seguritech's activities over the years.

Former President Felipe Calderón's war on drug trafficking, initiated during his 2006-2012 term, marked an important turning point for surveillance in Mexico. As Proceso reported, Seguritech began to secure major government contracts beginning in 2007, receiving its first billion-peso deal in 2011 with Sinaloa's state government. In 2013, avoiding the bidding process, the company secured a 6-billion peso contract assigned by Eruviel Ávila, then governor of the state of México (or Edomex, not to be confused with the country of Mexico). During Enrique Peña Nieto's years as Edomex's governor, and especially later, as Mexico's president, Seguritech secured its status among Mexico's top technology contractors.

According to Zeta Tijuana, during the six years that Peña Nieto served as president (2012-2018), the company monopolized contracts for the country's main surveillance and intelligence projects, specifically the C5i centers. As Zeta Tijuana writes:

"More than 10 C5i units were opened or began construction during Peña Nieto's six-year term. Federal entities committed budgets in the millions, amid opacity, violating parliamentary processes and administrative requirements. The purchase of obsolete technological equipment was authorized at an overpriced rate, hiding information under the pretext of protecting national security."

Zeta Tijuana further cites records from the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property showing that Seguritech registered the term "C5i" as its own brand, an apparent attempt to make it more difficult for other surveillance contractors to provide services under that name to the government.

Despite promises from government officials that these huge investments in surveillance would improve public safety, the country’s number of violent deaths increased during Peña Nieto's term in office.

"What is most shocking is how ineffective Seguritech's system is," says Quintana, the spokesperson for FPCDDH. By his analysis, Quintana says, "In five out of six states where Seguritech entered into contracts and provided security services, the annual crime rate shot up in proportions ranging from 11% to 85%."

Seguritech has also been criticized for inflated prices, technical failures, and deploying obsolete equipment. According to Norte Digital, only 17% of surveillance cameras were working by the end of the company's contract with Sinaloa's state government. Proceso notes the rise of complaints about the malfunctioning of cameras in Cuauhtémoc Delegation (a borough of Mexico City) in 2016. Zeta Tijuana reported on the disproportionate amount the company charged for installing 200 obsolete 2-megapixel cameras in 2018.

Seguritech's track record led to formal complaints and judicial cases against the company. The company has responded to this negative attention by hiring services to take down and censor critical stories about its activities published online, according to investigative reports published as part of the Global Investigative Journalism Network's Forbidden Stories project.

Yet, none of this information dissuaded Chihuahua's governor, Maru Campos, from closing a new no-bid contract with Seguritech to develop the Plataforma Centinela project. 

 A Cross-Border Collaboration 


The Plataforma Centinela project presents a troubling escalation in cross-border partnerships between states, one that cuts out each nation's respective federal governments.  In April 2022, the states of Texas and Chihuahua signed a memorandum of understanding to collaborate on reducing "cartels' human trafficking and smuggling of deadly fentanyl and other drugs" and to "stop the flow of migrants from over 100 countries who illegally enter Texas through Chihuahua."

A slide describing the "New Border Model"

While much of the agreement centers around cargo at the points of entry, the document also specifically calls out the various technologies that make up the Plataforma Centinela. In attachments to the agreement, Gov. Campos promises Chihuahua is "willing to share that information with Texas State authorities and commercial partners directly."

During a press conference announcing the MOU, Gov. Abbot declared, “Governor Campos has provided me with the best border security plan that I have seen from any governor from Mexico.” He held up a three-page outline and a slide, which were also provided to the public, but also referenced the existence of "a much more extensive detailed memo that explains in nuance" all the aspects of the program.

Abbott went on to read out a summary of Plataforma Centinela, adding, "This is a demonstration of commitment from a strong governor who is working collaboratively with the state of Texas."

Then Campos, in response to a reporter's question, added: "We are talking about sharing information and intelligence among states, which means the state of Texas will have eyes on this side of the border." She added that the data collected through the Plataforma Centinela will be analyzed by both the states of Chihuahua and Texas.

Abbott provided an example of one way the collaboration will work: "We will identify hotspots where there will be an increase in the number of migrants showing up because it's a location chosen by cartels to try to put people across the border at that particular location. The Chihuahua officials will work in collaboration with the Texas Department of Public Safety, where DPS has identified that hotspot and the Chihuahua side will work from a law enforcement side to disrupt that hotspot."

In order to learn more about the scope of the project, EFF sent public records requests to several Texas agencies, including the Governor's Office, the Texas Department of Public Safety, the Texas Attorney General's Office, the El Paso County Sheriff, and the El Paso Police Department. Not one of the agencies produced records related to the Plataforma Centinela project.

Meanwhile, Texas is further beefing up its efforts to use technology at the border, including by enacting new laws that formally allow the Texas National Guard and State Guard to deploy drones at the border and authorize the governor to enter compacts with other states to share intelligence and resource to build "a comprehensive technological surveillance system" on state land to deter illegal activity at the border. In addition to the MOU with Chihuahua, Abbott also signed similar agreements with the states of Nuevo León and Coahuila in 2022. 

Two Sides, One Border

The Plataforma Centinela has enormous potential to violate the rights of one of the largest cross-border populations along the U.S.-Mexico border. But while law enforcement officials are eager to collaborate and traffic data back and forth, advocacy efforts around surveillance too often are confined to their respective sides.

The Spanish-language press in Mexico has devoted significant resources to investigating the Plataforma Centinela and raising the alarm over its lack of transparency and accountability, as well as its potential for corruption. Yet, the project has received virtually no attention or scrutiny in the United States. 

Fighting back against surveillance of cross-border communities requires cross-border efforts. EFF supports the efforts of advocacy groups in Ciudad Juarez and other regions of Chihuahua to expose the mistakes the Chihuahua government is making with the Plataforma Centinela and call out its mammoth surveillance approach for failing to address the root social issues. We also salute the efforts by local journalists to hold the government accountable. However, U.S-based journalists, activists, and policymakers—many of whom have done an excellent job surfacing criticism of Customs and Border Protection's so-called virtual wall—must also turn their attention to the massive surveillance that is building up on the Mexican side.

In reality, there really is no Mexican surveillance and U.S. surveillance. It’s one massive surveillance monster that, ironically, in the name of border enforcement, recognizes no borders itself. 

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