The Constitution prohibits dragnet device searches, especially when those searches are designed to uncover political speech, EFF explained in a friend-of-the-court brief filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

The case, Armendariz v. City of Colorado Springs, challenges device and data seizures and searches conducted by the Colorado Springs police after a 2021 housing rights march that the police deemed “illegal.” The plaintiffs in the case, Jacqueline Armendariz and a local organization called the Chinook Center, argue these searches violated their civil rights.

The case details repeated actions by the police to target and try to intimidate plaintiffs and other local civil rights activists solely for their political speech. After the 2021 march, police arrested several protesters, including Ms. Armendariz. Police alleged Ms. Armendariz “threw” her bike at an officer as he was running, and despite that the bike never touched the officer, police charged her with attempted simple assault. Police then used that charge to support warrants to seize and search six of her electronic devices—including several phones and laptops. The search warrant authorized police to comb through these devices for all photos, videos, messages, emails, and location data sent or received over a two-month period and to conduct a time-unlimited search of 26 keywords—including for terms as broad and sweeping as “officer,” “housing,” “human,” “right,” “celebration,” “protest,” and several common names. Separately, police obtained a warrant to search all of the Chinook Center’s Facebook information and private messages sent and received by the organization for a week, even though the Center was not accused of any crime.

After Ms. Armendariz and the Chinook Center filed their civil rights suit, represented by the ACLU of Colorado, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case, arguing the searches were justified and, in any case, officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court agreed and dismissed the case. Ms. Armendariz and the Center appealed to the Tenth Circuit.

As explained in our amicus brief—which was joined by the Center for Democracy & Technology, the Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the Knight First Amendment Institute at Columbia University—the devices searched contain a wealth of personal information. For that reason, and especially where, as here, political speech is implicated, it is imperative that warrants comply with the Fourth Amendment.

The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Riley v. California that electronic devices such as smartphones “differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense” from other objects. Our electronic devices’ immense storage capacities means that just one type of data can reveal more than previously possible because they can span years’ worth of information. For example, location data can reveal a person’s “familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations.” And combined with all of the other available data—including photos, video, and communications—a device such as a smartphone or laptop can store a “digital record of nearly every aspect” of a person’s life, “from the mundane to the intimate.” Social media data can also reveal sensitive, private information, especially with respect to users' private messages.

It’s because our devices and the data they contain can be so revealing that warrants for this information must rigorously adhere to the Fourth Amendment’s requirements of probable cause and particularity.

Those requirements weren’t met here. The police’s warrants failed to establish probable cause that any evidence of the crime they charged Ms. Armendariz with—throwing her bike at an officer—would be found on her devices. And the search warrant, which allowed officers to rifle through months of her private records, was so overbroad and lacking in particularity as to constitute an unconstitutional “general warrant.” Similarly, the warrant for the Chinook Center’s Facebook messages lacked probable cause and was especially invasive given that access to these messages may well have allowed police to map activists who communicated with the Center and about social and political advocacy.

The warrants in this case were especially egregious because they appear designed to uncover First Amendment-protected activity. Where speech is targeted, the Supreme Court has recognized that it’s all the more crucial that warrants apply the Fourth Amendment’s requirements with “scrupulous exactitude” to limit an officer’s discretion in conducting a search. But that failed to happen here, and thus affected several of Ms. Armendariz and the Chinook Center’s First Amendment rights—including the right to free speech, the right to free association, and the right to receive information.

Warrants that fail to meet the Fourth Amendment’s requirements disproportionately burden disfavored groups. In fact, the Framers adopted the Fourth Amendment to prevent the “use of general warrants as instruments of oppression”—but as legal scholars have noted, law enforcement routinely uses low-level, highly discretionary criminal offenses to impose order on protests. Once arrests are made, they are often later dropped or dismissed—but the damage is done, because protesters are off the streets, and many may be chilled from returning. Protesters undoubtedly will be further chilled if an arrest for a low-level offense then allows police to rifle through their devices and digital data, as happened in this case.

The Tenth Circuit should let this case to proceed. Allowing police to conduct a virtual fishing expedition of a protester’s devices, especially when justification for that search is an arrest for a crime that has no digital nexus, contravenes the Fourth Amendment’s purposes and chills speech. It is unconstitutional and should not be tolerated.

Google announced this week that it will be making several important changes to the way it handles users’ “Location History” data. These changes would appear to make it much more difficult—if not impossible—for Google to provide mass location data in response to a geofence warrant, a change we’ve been asking Google to implement for years.

Geofence warrants require a provider—almost always Google—to search its entire reserve of user location data to identify all users or devices located within a geographic area during a time period specified by law enforcement. These warrants violate the Fourth Amendment because they are not targeted to a particular individual or device, like a typical warrant for digital communications. The only “evidence” supporting a geofence warrant is that a crime occurred in a particular area, and the perpetrator likely carried a cell phone that shared location data with Google. For this reason, they inevitably sweep up potentially hundreds of people who have no connection to the crime under investigation—and could turn each of those people into a suspect.

Geofence warrants have been possible because Google collects and stores specific user location data (which Google calls “Location History” data) altogether in a massive database called “Sensorvault.” Google reported several years ago that geofence warrants make up 25% of all warrants it receives each year.

Google’s announcement outlined three changes to how it will treat Location History data. First, going forward, this data will be stored, by default, on a user’s device, instead of with Google in the cloud. Second, it will be set by default to delete after three months; currently Google stores the data for at least 18 months. Finally, if users choose to back up their data to the cloud, Google will “automatically encrypt your backed-up data so no one can read it, including Google.”

All of this is fantastic news for users, and we are cautiously optimistic that this will effectively mean the end of geofence warrants. These warrants are dangerous. They threaten privacy and liberty because they not only provide police with sensitive data on individuals, they could turn innocent people into suspects. Further, they have been used during political protests and threaten free speech and our ability to speak anonymously, without fear of government repercussions. For these reasons, EFF has repeatedly challenged geofence warrants in criminal cases and worked with other groups (including tech companies) to push for legislative bans on their use.

However, we are not yet prepared to declare total victory. Google’s collection of users’ location data isn’t limited to just the “Location History” data searched in response to geofence warrants; Google collects additional location information as well. It remains to be seen whether law enforcement will find a way to access these other stores of location data on a mass basis in the future. Also, none of Google’s changes will prevent law enforcement from issuing targeted warrants for individual users’ location data—outside of Location History—if police have probable cause to support such a search.

But for now, at least, we’ll take this as a win. It’s very welcome news for technology users as we usher in the end of 2023.

Today, the Colorado Supreme Court became the first state supreme court in the country to address the constitutionality of a keyword warrant—a digital dragnet tool that allows law enforcement to identify everyone who searched the internet for a specific term or phrase. In a weak and ultimately confusing opinion, the court upheld the warrant, finding the police relied on it in good faith. EFF filed two amicus briefs and was heavily involved in the case.

The case is People v. Seymour, which involved a tragic home arson that killed several people. Police didn’t have a suspect, so they used a keyword warrant to ask Google for identifying information on anyone and everyone who searched for variations on the home’s street address in the two weeks prior to the arson.

Like geofence warrants, keyword warrants cast a dragnet that require a provider to search its entire reserve of user data—in this case, queries by one billion Google users. Police generally have no identified suspects; instead, the sole basis for the warrant is the officer’s hunch that the suspect might have searched for something in some way related to the crime.

Keyword warrants rely on the fact that it is virtually impossible to navigate the modern Internet without entering search queries into a search engine like Google's. By some accounts, there are over 1.15 billion websites, and tens of billions of webpages. Google Search processes as many as 100,000 queries every second. Many users have come to rely on search engines to such a degree that they routinely search for the answers to sensitive or unflattering questions that they might never feel comfortable asking a human confidant, even friends, family members, doctors, or clergy. Over the course of months and years, there is little about a user’s life that will not be reflected in their search keywords, from the mundane to the most intimate. The result is a vast record of some of users’ most private and personal thoughts, opinions, and associations.

In the Seymour opinion, the four-justice majority recognized that people have a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in their internet search queries and that these queries impact a person’s free speech rights. The federal Supreme Court has held that warrants like this one that target speech are highly suspect so courts must apply constitutional search-and-seizure requirements with “scrupulous exactitude.” Despite recognizing this directive to engage in careful, in-depth analysis, the Seymour majority’s reasoning was cursory and at points mistaken. For example, although the court found that the Colorado constitution protects users’ privacy interests in their search queries, it held that the Fourth Amendment does not, due to the third party doctrine, because federal courts have held that there is no expectation of privacy in IP addresses. However, this overlooks the queries themselves, which many courts have suggested are more akin to the location information that was found to be protected in Carpenter v. United States. Similarly, the Colorado court neglected to address the constitutionality of Google’s initial search of all its users’ search queries because it found that the things seized—users’ queries and IP addresses—were sufficiently narrow. Finally, the court merely assumed without deciding that the warrant lacked probable cause, a shortcut that allowed the court to overlook the warrant's facial deficiency and therefore uphold it on the “good faith exception.”

If the majority had truly engaged with the deep constitutional issues presented by this keyword warrant, it would have found, as the three-justices dissenting on this point did, that keyword warrants “are tantamount to a high-tech version of the reviled ‘general warrants’ that first gave rise to the protections in the Fourth Amendment.” They lack probable cause because a mere hunch that some unknown person might have searched for a specific phrase related to the crime is insufficient to support a search of everyone’s search queries, let alone a specific, previously unnamed individual. And keyword warrants are insufficiently particular because they do next to nothing to narrow the universe of the search.

We are disappointed in the result in this case. Keyword warrants not only have the potential to implicate innocent people, they allow the government to target people for sensitive search terms like the drug mifepristone, or the names of gender-affirming healthcare providers, or information about psychedelic drugs. Even searches that refer to crimes or acts of terror are not themselves criminal in all or even most cases (otherwise historians, reporters, and crime novelists could all be subject to criminal investigation). Dragnet warrants that target speech have no place in a democracy, and we will continue to challenge them in the courts and to support legislation to ban them entirely.