This year, like every year, EFF sent a variety of lawyers, technologists, and activists to the summer security conferences in Las Vegas to help foster support for the security research community. While we were at DEF CON 32, security researcher Dennis Giese received a cease-and-desist letter on a Thursday afternoon for his talk scheduled just hours later for Friday morning. EFF lawyers met with Dennis almost immediately, and by Sunday, Dennis was able to give his talk. Here’s what happened, and why the fight for coders’ rights matters.

Throughout the year, we receive a number of inquiries from security researchers who seek to report vulnerabilities or present on technical exploits and want to understand the legal risks involved. Enter the EFF Coders’ Rights Project, designed to help programmers, tinkerers, and innovators who wish to responsibly explore technologies and report on those findings. Our Coders Rights lawyers counsel many of those who reach out to us on anything from mitigating legal risk in their talks, to reporting vulnerabilities they’ve found, to responding to legal threats. The number of inquiries often ramp up in the months leading to “hacker summer camp,” but we usually have at least a couple of weeks to help and advise the researcher.

In this case, however, we did our work on an extremely short schedule.

Dennis is a prolific researcher who has presented his work at conferences around the world. At DEF CON, one of the talks he planned along with a co-presenter involved digital locks, including the vendor Digilock. In the months leading up to the presentation, Dennis shared his findings with Digilock and sought to discuss potential remediations. Digilock expressed interest in these conversations, so it came as a surprise when the company sent him the cease-and-desist letter on the eve of the presentation raising a number of baseless legal claims.

Because we had lawyers on the ground at DEF CON, Dennis was able to connect with EFF soon after receiving the cease-and-desist and, along with former EFF attorney and current Special Counsel to EFF, Kurt Opsahl, we agreed to represent him in responding to Digilock. Over the course of forty-eight hours, we were able to meet with Digilock’s lawyers and ultimately facilitated a productive conversation between Dennis and its CEO.

Good-faith security researchers increase security for all of us.

To its credit, Digilock agreed to rescind the cease-and-desist letter and also provided Dennis with useful information about its plans to address vulnerabilities discussed in his research.

Dennis was able to give the talk, with this additional information, on Sunday, the last day of DEF CON.

We are proud we could help Dennis navigate what can be a scary situation of receiving last-minute legal threats, and are happy that he was ultimately able to give his talk. Good-faith security researchers like Dennis increase security for all of us who use digital devices. By identifying and disclosing vulnerabilities, hackers are able to improve security for every user who depends on information systems for their daily life and work. If we do not know about security vulnerabilities, we cannot fix them, and we cannot make better computer systems in the future. Dennis’s research was not only legal, it demonstrated real world problems that the companies involved need to address.

Just as important as discovering security vulnerabilities is reporting the findings so that users can protect themselves, vendors can avoid introducing vulnerabilities in the future, and other security researchers can build off that information. By publicly explaining these sorts of attacks and proposing remedies, other companies that make similar devices can also benefit by fixing these vulnerabilities. In discovering and reporting on their findings, security researchers like Dennis help build a safer future for all of us.

However, this incident reminds us that even good faith hackers are often faced with legal challenges meant to silence them from publicly sharing the legitimate fruits of their labor. The Coders' Rights Project is part of our long standing work to protect researchers through legal defense, education, amicus briefs, and involvement in the community. Through it, we hope to promote innovation and safeguard the rights of curious tinkerers and hackers everywhere.

We must continue to fight for the right to share this research, which leads to better security for us all. If you are a security researcher in need of legal assistance or have concerns before giving a talk, do not hesitate to reach out to us. If you'd like to support more of this work, please consider donating to EFF.

In a major decision on Friday, the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that geofence warrants are “categorically prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.” Closely following arguments EFF has made in a number of cases, the court found that geofence warrants constitute the sort of “general, exploratory rummaging” that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment intended to outlaw. EFF applauds this decision because it is essential that every person feels like they can simply take their cell phone out into the world without the fear that they might end up a criminal suspect because their location data was swept up in open-ended digital dragnet.

The new Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Smith, involved an armed robbery and assault of a US Postal Service worker at a post office in Mississippi in 2018. After several months of investigation, police had no identifiable suspects, so they obtained a geofence warrant covering a large geographic area around the post office for the hour surrounding the crime. Google responded to the warrant with information on several devices, ultimately leading police to the two defendants.

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reached several important holdings.

First, it determined that under the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Carpenter v. United States, individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location data implicated by geofence warrants. As a result, the court broke from the Fourth Circuit’s deeply flawed decision last month in United States v. Chatrie, noting that although geofence warrants can be more “limited temporally” than the data sought in Carpenter, geofence location data is still highly invasive because it can expose sensitive information about a person’s associations and allow police to “follow” them into private spaces.

Second, the court found that even though investigators seek warrants for geofence location data, these searches are inherently unconstitutional. As the court noted, geofence warrants require a provider, almost always Google, to search “the entirety” of its reserve of location data “while law enforcement officials have no idea who they are looking for, or whether the search will even turn up a result.” Therefore, “the quintessential problem with these warrants is that they never include a specific user to be identified, only a temporal and geographic location where any given user may turn up post-search. That is constitutionally insufficient.”

Unsurprisingly, however, the court found that in 2018, police could have relied on such a warrant in “good faith,” because geofence technology was novel, and police reached out to other agencies with more experience for guidance. This means that the evidence they obtained will not be suppressed in this case.

Nevertheless, it is gratifying to see an appeals court recognize the fundamental invasions of privacy created by these warrants and uphold our constitutional tradition prohibiting general searches. Police around the country have increasingly relied on geofence warrants and other reverse warrants, and this opinion should act as a warning against narrow applications of Fourth Amendment precedent in these cases.

Legal intern Danya Hajjaji was the lead author of this post.

EFF filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit supporting a group of journalists in their lawsuit against Israeli spyware company NSO Group. In our amicus brief backing the plaintiffs’ appeal, we argued that victims of human rights abuses enabled by powerful surveillance technologies must be able to seek redress through U.S. courts against both foreign and domestic corporations. 

NSO Group notoriously manufactures “Pegasus” spyware, which enables full remote control of a target’s smartphone. Pegasus attacks are stealthy and sophisticated: the spyware embeds itself into phones without an owner having to click anything (such as an email or text message). A Pegasus-infected phone allows government operatives to intercept personal data on a device as well as cloud-based data connected to the device.

Our brief highlights multiple examples of Pegasus spyware having been used by governmental bodies around the world to spy on targets such as journalists, human rights defenders, dissidents, and their families. For example, the Saudi Arabian government was found to have deployed Pegasus against Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi, who was murdered at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.

In the present case, Dada v. NSO Group, the plaintiffs are affiliated with El Faro, a prominent independent news outlet based in El Salvador, and were targeted with Pegasus through their iPhones. The attacks on El Faro journalists coincided with their investigative reporting into the Salvadorian government.

The plaintiffs sued NSO Group in California because NSO Group, in deploying Pegasus against iPhones, abused the services of Apple, a California-based company. However, the district court dismissed the case on a forum non conveniens theory, holding that California is an inconvenient forum for NSO Group. The court thus concluded that exercising jurisdiction over the foreign corporation was inappropriate and that the case would be better considered by a court in Israel or elsewhere.

However, as we argued in our brief, NSO Group is already defending two other lawsuits in California brought by both Apple and WhatsApp. And the company is unlikely to face legal accountability in its home country—the Israeli Ministry of Defense provides an export license to NSO Group, and its technology has been used against citizens within Israel.

That's why this case is critical—victims of powerful, increasingly-common surveillance technologies like Pegasus spyware must not be barred from U.S. courts.

As we explained in our brief, the private spyware industry is a lucrative industry worth an estimated $12 billion, largely bankrolled by repressive governments. These parties widely fail to comport with the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which caution against creating a situation where victims of human rights abuses “face a denial of justice in a host State and cannot access home State courts regardless of the merits of the claim.”

The U.S. government has endorsed the Guiding Principles as applied to U.S. companies selling surveillance technologies to foreign governments, but also sought to address the issue of spyware facilitating state-sponsored human rights violations. In 2021, for example, the Biden Administration recognized NSO Group as engaging in such practices by placing it on a list of entities prohibited from receiving U.S. exports of hardware or software.

Unfortunately, the Guiding Principles expressly avoid creating any “new international law obligations,” thus leaving accountability to either domestic law or voluntary mechanisms.

Yet voluntary enforcement mechanisms are wholly inadequate for human rights accountability. The weakness of voluntary enforcement is best illustrated by NSO Group supposedly implementing its own human rights policies, all the while acting as a facilitator of human rights abuses.

Restraining the use of the forum non conveniens doctrine and opening courthouse doors to victims of human rights violations wrought by surveillance technologies would bind companies like NSO Group through judicial liability.

But this would not mean that U.S. courts have unfettered discretion over foreign corporations. The reach of courts is limited by rules of personal jurisdiction and plaintiffs must still prove the specific required elements of their legal claims.

The Ninth Circuit must give the El Faro plaintiffs the chance to vindicate their rights in federal court. Shielding spyware companies like NSO Group from legal accountability does not only diminish digital civil liberties like privacy and freedom of speech—it paves the way for the worst of the worst human rights abuses, including physical apprehensions, unlawful detentions, torture, and even summary executions by the governments that use the spyware.

We haven’t seen the end of invasive geofence warrants just yet, despite Google’s big announcement late last year that it was fundamentally changing how it collects location data. Today, EFF is filing an amicus brief in the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Contreras-Sanchez, involving a warrant that directed Google to turn over an entire month of location data in response to a geofence warrant. Our brief argues that warrant violates the Fourth Amendment and Minnesota’s state constitution.

Geofence warrants require a provider—almost always Google—to search its entire reserve of user location data to identify all users or devices located within a geographic area during a time period specified by law enforcement. This creates a high risk of turning suspicion on innocent people for crimes they didn’t commit and can reveal sensitive and private information about where individuals have traveled in the past. We’ve seen a recent flurry of court cases involving geofence warrants, and these courts’ rulings will set important Fourth Amendment precedent not just in geofence cases, but other investigations involving similar “reverse warrants” such as users’ keyword searches on search engines.

In Contreras-Sanchez, police discovered a dead body on the side of a rural roadway. They did not know when the body was disposed of and had few leads, so they sought a warrant directing Google to turn over location data for the area around the site for the previous month. Notably, Google responded that turning over the entire monthlong dataset would be too “cumbersome,” even though it covered only a relatively sparsely populated area. Instead, following the now-familiar “three-step” process for geofence warrants, Google provided police with location data corresponding to twelve devices that had entered the area over a single week period. Police focused in on one device, then sought identifying information on that device, leading them to the defendant.

EFF’s brief, filed along with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers and the Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, argues that the geofence warrant acted as a “general warrant” akin to the practices of the British agents in Colonial America who were authorized to go house by house, searching for smuggled goods and evidence of seditious publications. As we write in the brief:

This general warrant allowed law enforcement to go Google account by Google account, searching each user’s private location data for evidence of an alleged crime. The same concerns that animated staunch objection to general warrants in the past are equally relevant to geofence warrants today; these warrants lack individualized suspicion, allow for unbridled officer discretion, and impact the privacy rights of countless innocent individuals. And, like the eighteenth-century writs of assistance that inspired the Fourth Amendment’s drafters, geofence warrants are especially pernicious because they also have the potential to affect fundamental rights including freedom of speech, association, and bodily autonomy. Neither the Fourth Amendment, nor Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution tolerate a warrant of this breadth.

Federal appeals court makes a serious misstep on geofence warrants

Meanwhile, in the leading federal geofence case, United States v. Chatrie, the federal Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit issued a seriously misguided opinion earlier this month, holding that a geofence warrant covering a busy area around a bank robbery for two hours wasn’t even a Fourth Amendment search at all—meaning that the police wouldn’t necessarily need a warrant to get access to all of this sensitive location data. The two-judge majority opinion effectively ignores the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark Fourth Amendment location data case, Carpenter v. United States, and similarly tries to distinguish the Fourth Circuit’s own important precedent in Leaders of a Beautiful Struggle v. Baltimore Police Department. In the majority’s view, in order to be a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, the government must collect a significant amount of location data over a long period of time, and the two-hour period at issue in Chatrie simply wasn’t long enough to interfere with individuals’ reasonable expectation of privacy in the “whole of their physical movements” the way longer surveillance was in Carpenter and Leaders.

But in a scathing, 70-plus page dissenting opinion, Judge Wynn dismantled these arguments, showing that Carpenter requires courts to look beyond formulaic applications of precedent and examine the actual character of the surveillance at issue. On nearly every metric, geofence warrants have the capacity to reveal just as, if not more, private and intimate associations than the tracking at issue in Carpenter. What’s more, Judge Wynn’s dissent demonstrated what we’ve argued in geofence cases across the country: These warrants violate the Fourth Amendment because they are not targeted to a particular individual or device, like a typical warrant for digital communications. The only “evidence” supporting a geofence warrant is that a crime occurred in a particular area, and the perpetrator likely carried a cell phone that shared location data with Google. For this reason, they inevitably sweep up potentially hundreds of people who have no connection to the crime under investigation—and could turn each of those people into a suspect.

Chatrie’s lawyers are petitioning the entire Fourth Circuit to review the case, and we’re hopeful that the Chatrie panel opinion will be overturned by the full court en banc. We’ll be filing another amicus brief supporting Chatrie’s petition. Stay tuned for that and for the ruling from the Minnesota Supreme Court in Contreras-Sanchez. 

The Canadian House of Commons is currently considering Bill C-26, which would make sweeping amendments to the country’s Telecommunications Act that would expand its Minister of Industry’s power over telecommunication service providers. It’s designed to accomplish a laudable and challenging goal: ensure that government and industry partners efficiently and effectively work together to strengthen Canada’s network security in the face of repeated hacking attacks.

C-26 is not identical to US national security laws. But without adequate safeguards, it could open the door to similar practices and orders.

As researchers and civil society organizations have noted, however, the legislation contains vague and overbroad language that may invite abuse and pressure on ISPs to do the government’s bidding at the expense of Canadian privacy rights. It would vest substantial authority in Canadian executive branch officials to (in the words of C-26’s summary) “direct telecommunications service providers to do anything, or refrain from doing anything, that is necessary to secure the Canadian telecommunications system.” That could include ordering telecommunications companies to install backdoors inside encrypted elements in Canada’s networks. Safeguards to protect privacy and civil rights are few; C-26’s only express limit is that Canadian officials cannot order service providers to intercept private or radio-based telephone communications.

Unfortunately, we in the United States know all too well what can happen when government officials assert broad discretionary power over telecommunications networks. For over 20 years, the U.S. government has deputized internet service providers and systems to surveil Americans and their correspondents, without meaningful judicial oversight. These legal authorities and details of the surveillance have varied, but, in essence, national security law has allowed the U.S. government to vacuum up digital communications so long as the surveillance is directed at foreigners currently located outside the United States and doesn’t intentionally target Americans. Once collected, the FBI can search through this massive database of information by “querying” the communications of specific individuals. In 2021 alone, the FBI conducted up to 3.4 million warrantless searches to find Americans’ communications.

Congress has attempted to add in additional safeguards over the years, to little avail. In 2023, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released internal documents used to guide agency personnel on how to search the massive databases of information they collect. Despite reassurances from the intelligence community about its “culture of compliance,” these documents reflect little interest in protecting privacy or civil liberties. At the same time, the NSA and domestic law enforcement authorities have been seeking to undermine the encryption tools and processes on which we all rely to protect our privacy and security.

C-26 is not identical to U.S. national security laws. But without adequate safeguards, it could open the door to similar practices and orders. What is worse, some of those orders could be secret, at the government’s discretion. In the U.S., that kind of secrecy has made it impossible for Americans to challenge mass surveillance in court. We’ve also seen companies presented with gag orders in connection with “national security letters” compelling them to hand over information. C-26 does allow for judicial review of non-secret orders, e.g. an order requiring an ISP to cut off an account-holder or website, if the subject of those orders believes they are unreasonable or ungrounded. But that review may include secret evidence that is kept from applicants and their counsel.

Canadian courts will decide whether a law authorizing secret orders and evidence is consistent with Canada’s legal tradition. But either way, the U.S. experience offers a cautionary tale of what can happen when a government grants itself broad powers to monitor and direct telecommunications networks, absent corresponding protections for human rights. In effect, the U.S. government has created, in the name of national security, a broad exception to the Constitution that allows the government to spy on all Americans and denies them any viable means of challenging that spying. We hope Canadians will refuse to allow their government to do the same in the name of “cybersecurity.”

One week after it was passed by the U.S. House of Representatives, the Senate has passed what Senator Ron Wyden has called, “one of the most dramatic and terrifying expansions of government surveillance authority in history.” President Biden then rushed to sign it into law.  

The perhaps ironically named “Reforming Intelligence and Securing America Act (RISAA)” does everything BUT reform Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). RISAA not only reauthorizes this mass surveillance program, it greatly expands the government’s authority by allowing it to compel a much larger group of people and providers into assisting with this surveillance. The bill’s only significant “compromise” is a limited, two-year extension of this mass surveillance. But overall, RISAA is a travesty for Americans who deserve basic constitutional rights and privacy whether they are communicating with people and services inside or outside of the US.

Section 702 allows the government to conduct surveillance of foreigners abroad from inside the United States. It operates, in part, through the cooperation of large telecommunications service providers: massive amounts of traffic on the Internet backbone are accessed and those communications on the government’s secret list are copied. And that’s just one part of the massive, expensive program. 

While Section 702 prohibits the NSA and FBI from intentionally targeting Americans with this mass surveillance, these agencies routinely acquire a huge amount of innocent Americans' communications “incidentally.” The government can then conduct backdoor, warrantless searches of these “incidentally collected” communications.

The government cannot even follow the very lenient rules about what it does with the massive amount of information it gathers under Section 702, repeatedly abusing this authority by searching its databases for Americans’ communications. In 2021 alone, the FBI reported conducting up to 3.4 million warrantless searches of Section 702 data using Americans’ identifiers. Given this history of abuse, it is difficult to understand how Congress could decide to expand the government’s power under Section 702 rather than rein it in.

One of RISAA’s most egregious expansions is its large but ill-defined increase of the range of entities that have to turn over information to the NSA and FBI. This provision allegedly “responds” to a 2023 decision by the FISC Court of Review, which rejected the government’s argument that an unknown company was subject to Section 702 for some circumstances. While the New York Times reports that the unknown company from this FISC opinion was a data center, this new provision is written so expansively that it potentially reaches any person or company with “access” to “equipment” on which electronic communications travel or are stored, regardless of whether they are a direct provider. This could potentially include landlords, maintenance people, and many others who routinely have access to your communications on the interconnected internet.

This is to say nothing of RISAA’s other substantial expansions. RISAA changes FISA’s definition of “foreign intelligence” to include “counternarcotics”: this will allow the government to use FISA to collect information relating to not only the “international production, distribution, or financing of illicit synthetic drugs, opioids, cocaine, or other drugs driving overdose deaths,” but also to any of their precursors. While surveillance under FISA has (contrary to what most Americans believe) never been limited exclusively to terrorism and counterespionage, RISAA’s expansion of FISA to ordinary crime is unacceptable.

RISAA also allows the government to use Section 702 to vet immigrants and those seeking asylum. According to a FISC opinion released in 2023, the FISC repeatedly denied government attempts to obtain some version of this authority, before finally approving it for the first time in 2023. By formally lowering Section 702’s protections for immigrants and asylum seekers, RISAA exacerbates the risk that government officials could discriminate against members of these populations on the basis of their sexuality, gender identity, religion, or political beliefs.

Faced with massive pushback from EFF and other civil liberties advocates, some members of Congress, like Senator Ron Wyden, raised the alarm. We were able to squeeze out a couple of small concessions. One was a shorter reauthorization period for Section 702, meaning that the law will be up for review in just two more years. Also, in a letter to Congress, the Department of Justice claimed it would only interpret the new provision to apply to the type of unidentified businesses at issue in the 2023 FISC opinion. But a pinky promise from the current Department of Justice is not enforceable and easily disregarded by a future administration. There is some possible hope here, because Senator Mark Warner promised to return to the provision in a later defense authorization bill, but this whole debacle just demonstrates how Congress gives the NSA and FBI nearly free rein when it comes to protecting Americans – any limitation that actually protects us (and here the FISA Court actually did some protecting) is just swept away.

RISAA’s passage is a shocking reversal—EFF and our allies had worked hard to put together a coalition aimed at enacting a warrant requirement for Americans and some other critical reforms, but the NSA, FBI and their apologists just rolled Congress with scary-sounding (and incorrect) stories that a lapse in the spying was imminent. It was a clear dereliction of Congress’s duty to oversee the intelligence community in order to protect all of the rest of us from its long history of abuse.

After over 20 years of doing it, we know that rolling back any surveillance authority, especially one as deeply entrenched as Section 702, is an uphill fight. But we aren’t going anywhere. We had more Congressional support this time than we’ve had in the past, and we’ll be working to build that over the next two years.

Too many members of Congress (and the Administrations of both parties) don’t see any downside to violating your privacy and your constitutional rights in the name of national security. That needs to change.

This post was drafted by EFF legal intern Alissa Johnson.

EFF signed on to an amicus brief drafted by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers earlier this month petitioning the Oregon Supreme Court to review State v. Simons, a case involving law enforcement surveillance of over a year’s worth of private internet activity. We ask that the Court join the Ninth Circuit in recognizing that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their browsing histories, and that checking a box to access public Wi-Fi does not waive Fourth Amendment rights.

Mr. Simons was convicted of downloading child pornography after police warrantlessly captured his browsing history on an A&W restaurant’s public Wi-Fi network, which he accessed from his home across the street. The network was not password-protected but did require users to agree to an acceptable use policy, which noted that while web activity would not be actively monitored under normal circumstances, A&W “may cooperate with legal authorities.” A private consultant hired by the restaurant noticed a device on the network accessing child pornography sites and turned over logs of all of the device’s unencrypted internet activity, both illegal and benign, to law enforcement.

The Court of Appeals asserted that Mr. Simons had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his browsing history on A&W’s free Wi-Fi network. We disagree.

Browsing history reveals some of the most sensitive personal information that exists—the very privacies of life that the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect. It can allow police to uncover political and religious affiliation, medical history, sexual orientation, or immigration status, among other personal details. Internet users know how much of their private information is exposed through browsing data, take steps to protect it, and expect it to remain private.

Courts have also recognized that browsing history offers an extraordinarily detailed picture of someone’s private life. In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court cited browsing history as an example of the deeply private information that can be found on a cell phone. The Ninth Circuit went a step further in holding that people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their browsing histories.

People’s expectation of privacy in browsing history doesn’t disappear when tapping “I Agree” on a long scroll of Terms of Service to access public Wi-Fi. Private businesses monitoring internet activity to protect their commercial interests does not license the government to sidestep a warrant requirement, or otherwise waive constitutional rights.

The price of participation in public society cannot be the loss of Fourth Amendment rights to be free of unreasonable government infringement on our privacy. As the Supreme Court noted in Carpenter v. United States, “A person does not surrender all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere.” People cannot negotiate the terms under which they use public Wi-Fi, and in practicality have no choice but to accept the terms dictated by the network provider.

The Oregon Court of Appeals’ assertion that access to public Wi-Fi is convenient but not necessary for participation in modern life ignores well-documented inequalities in internet access across race and class. Fourth Amendment rights are for everyone, not just those with private residences and a Wi-Fi budget.

Allowing private businesses’ Terms of Service to dictate our constitutional rights threatens to make a “crazy quilt” of the Fourth Amendment, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Smith v. Maryland. Pinning constitutional protection to the contractual provisions of private parties is absurd and impracticable. Almost all of us rely on Wi-Fi outside of our homes, and that access should be protected against government surveillance.

We hope that the Oregon Supreme Court accepts Mr. Simons’ petition for review to address the important constitutional questions at stake in this case.

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is one of the most insidious and secretive mass surveillance authorities still in operation today. The Security and Freedom Enhancement (SAFE) Act would make some much-needed and long fought-for reforms, but it also does not go nearly far enough to rein in a surveillance law that the federal government has abused time and time again.

You can read the full text of the bill here.

While Section 702 was first sold as a tool necessary to stop foreign terrorists, it has since become clear that the government uses the communications it collects under this law as a domestic intelligence source. The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between people overseas on U.S. persons. Now, it’s this US side of digital conversations that are being routinely sifted through by domestic law enforcement agencies—all without a warrant.

The SAFE Act, like other reform bills introduced this Congress, attempts to roll back some of this warrantless surveillance. Despite its glaring flaws and omissions, in a Congress as dysfunctional as this one it might be the bill that best privacy-conscious people and organizations can hope for. For instance, it does not do as much as the Government Surveillance Reform Act, which EFF supported in November 2023. But imposing meaningful checks on the Intelligence Community (IC) is an urgent priority, especially because the Intelligence Community has been trying to sneak a "clean" reauthorization of Section 702 into government funding bills, and has even sought to have the renewal happen in secret in the hopes of keeping its favorite mass surveillance law intact. The administration is also reportedly planning to seek another year-long extension of the law without any congressional action. All the while, those advocating for renewing Section 702 have toyed with as many talking points as they can—from cybercrime or human trafficking to drug smuggling, terrorism, oreven solidarity activism in the United States—to see what issue would scare people sufficiently enough to allow for a clean reauthorization of mass surveillance.

So let’s break down the SAFE Act: what’s good, what’s bad, and what aspects of it might actually cause more harm in the future. 

What’s Good about the SAFE Act

The SAFE Act would do at least two things that reform advocates have pressured Congress to include in any proposed bill to reauthorize Section 702. This speaks to the growing consensus that some reforms are absolutely necessary if this power is to remain operational.

The first and most important reform the bill would make is to require the government to obtain a warrant before accessing the content of communications for people in the United States. Currently, relying on Section 702, the government vacuums up communications from all over the world, and a huge number of those intercepted communications are to or from US persons. Those communications sit in a massive database. Both intelligence agencies and law enforcement have conducted millions of queries of this database for US-based communications—all without a warrant—in order to investigate both national security concerns and run-of-the-mill criminal investigations. The SAFE Act would prohibit “warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons and persons located in the United States.” While this is the bare minimum a reform bill should do, it’s an important step. It is crucial to note, however, that this does not stop the IC or law enforcement from querying to see if the government has collected communications from specific individuals under Section 702—it merely stops them from reading those communications without a warrant.

The second major reform the SAFE Act provides is to close the “data brooker loophole,” which EFF has been calling attention to for years. As one example, mobile apps often collect user data to sell it to advertisers on the open market. The problem is law enforcement and intelligence agencies increasingly buy this private user data, rather than obtain a warrant for it. This bill would largely prohibit the government from purchasing personal data they would otherwise need a warrant to collect. This provision does include a potentially significant exception for situations where the government cannot exclude Americans’ data from larger “compilations” that include foreigners’ data. This speaks not only to the unfair bifurcation of rights between Americans and everyone else under much of our surveillance law, but also to the risks of allowing any large scale acquisition from data brokers at all. The SAFE Act would require the government to minimize collection, search, and use of any Americans’ data in these compilations, but it remains to be seen how effective these prohibitions will be. 

What’s Missing from the SAFE Act

The SAFE Act is missing a number of important reforms that we’ve called for—and which the Government Surveillance Reform Act would have addressed. These reforms include ensuring that individuals harmed by warrantless surveillance are able to challenge it in court, both in civil lawsuits like those brought by EFF in the past, and in criminal cases where the government may seek to shield its use of Section 702 from defendants. After nearly 14 years of Section 702 and countless court rulings slamming the courthouse door on such legal challenges, it’s well past time to ensure that those harmed by Section 702 surveillance can have the opportunity to challenge it.

New Problems Potentially Created by the SAFE Act

While there may often be good reason to protect the secrecy of FISA proceedings, unofficial disclosures about these proceedings has from the very beginning played an indispensable role in reforming uncontested abuses of surveillance authorities. From the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping program through the Snowden disclosures up to the present, when reporting about FISA applications appears on the front page of the New York Times, oversight of the intelligence community would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without these disclosures.

Unfortunately, the SAFE Act contains at least one truly nasty addition to current law: an entirely new crime that makes it a felony to disclose “the existence of an application” for foreign intelligence surveillance or any of the application’s contents. In addition to explicitly adding to the existing penalties in the Espionage Act—itself highly controversial— this new provision seems aimed at discouraging leaks by increasing the potential sentence to eight years in prison. There is no requirement that prosecutors show that the disclosure harmed national security, nor any consideration of the public interest. Under the present climate, there’s simply no reason to give prosecutors even more tools like this one to punish whistleblowers who are seen as going through improper channels.

EFF always aims to tell it like it is. This bill has some real improvements, but it’s nowhere near the surveillance reform we all deserve. On the other hand, the IC and its allies in Congress continue to have significant leverage to push fake reform bills, so the SAFE Act may well be the best we’re going to get. Either way, we’re not giving up the fight.  

Last week, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors violated a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination when they presented testimony about his refusal to give police the passcode to his cell phone. In State v. Valdez, the court found that verbally telling police a passcode is “testimonial” under the Fifth Amendment, and that the so-called foregone conclusion exception does not apply to “ordinary testimony” like this. This closely tracks arguments in the amicus brief EFF and the ACLU filed in the case.

The Utah court’s opinion is the latest in a thicket of state supreme court opinions dealing with whether law enforcement agents can compel suspects to disclose or enter their passwords. Last month, EFF supported a petition asking the U.S. Supreme Court to review People v. Sneed, an Illinois Supreme Court opinion that reached a contrary conclusion. As we explained in that brief, courts around the country are struggling to apply Fifth Amendment case law to the context of compelled disclosure and entry of passcodes.

The Fifth Amendment privilege protects suspects from being forced to provide “testimonial” answers to incriminating lines of questioning. So it would seem straightforward that asking “what is your passcode?” should be off limits. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court had no trouble finding that verbally disclosing a passcode was protected as a “traditionally testimonial communication.” Notably there has been dissent from even this straightforward rule by the New Jersey Supreme Court. However, many cases—like the Sneed case from Illinois—involve a less clear demand by law enforcement: “tell us your passcode or just enter it.”

Unfortunately, many courts, including Utah, have applied a different standard to entering rather than disclosing a passcode. Under this reasoning, verbally telling police a passcode is explicitly testimonial, whereas entering a passcode is only implicitly testimonial as an “act of production,” comparable to turning over incriminating documents in response to a subpoena. But as we’ve argued, entering a passcode should be treated as purely testimonial in the same way that nodding or shaking your head in response to a question is. More fundamentally, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that even testimonial “acts of production,” like assembling documents in response to a subpoena, are privileged and cannot be compelled without expansive grants of immunity.

A related issue has generated even more confusion: whether police can compel a suspect to enter a passcode because they claim that the testimony it implies is a “foregone conclusion.” The foregone conclusion “exception” stems from a single U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. Fisher, involving specific tax records—a far cry from a world where we carry our entire life history around on a phone. Nevertheless, prosecutors routinely argue it applies any time the government can show suspects know the passcode to their phones. Even Supreme Court justices like Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas have viewed Fisher as a historical outlier, and it should not be the basis of such a dramatic erosion of Fifth Amendment rights.

Thankfully, the Utah Supreme Court held that the foregone conclusion doctrine had no application in a case involving verbal testimony, but it left open the possibility of a different rule in cases involving compelled entry of a passcode. Make no mistake, Valdez is a victory for Utahns’ right to refuse to participate in their own investigation and prosecution. But we will continue to fight to ensure this right is given its full measure across the country.

With Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) set to expire at the end of the year, Congress is considering whether to reauthorize the law and if so, whether to make any necessary amendments to the invasive surveillance authority. 

While Section 702 was first sold as a tool necessary to stop foreign terrorists, it has since become clear that the government uses the communications it collects under this law as a domestic intelligence source. The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between people overseas on U.S. persons. Increasingly, it’s this U.S. side of digital conversations that are being routinely sifted through by domestic law enforcement agencies—all without a warrant. 

The congressional authorization for Section 702 expires in December 2023, and it’s in light of the current administration’s attempts to renew this authority that we demand that Congress must not reauthorize Section 702 without reforms. It’s more necessary than ever to pass reforms that prevent longstanding and widespread abuses of the program and that advance due process for everyone who communicates online.

U.S. Senators Ron Wyden, and Sen. Mike Lee, with cosponsors Senators Tammy Baldwin, Steve Daines, Mazie Hirono, Cynthia Lummis, Jon Tester, Elizabeth Warren, and Edward Markey, along with Representatives Zoe Lofren, Warren Davidson have introduced the Government Surveillance Reform Act that would reauthorize Section 702 with many of these important safeguards in place.

EFF supports this bill and encourages Congress to implement these critical measures:

Government Queries of Section 702 Databases

Under the Fourth Amendment, when the FBI or other law enforcement entity wants to search your emails, it must convince a judge there’s reason to believe your emails will contain evidence of a crime. But because of the way the NSA implements Section 702, communications from innocent Americans are routinely collected and stored in government databases, which are accessible to the FBI, the CIA, and the National Counterterrorism Center.

So instead of having to get a warrant to collect this data, it’s already in government servers. And the government currently decides for itself whether it can look through (“query”) its databases for Americans’ communications—decisions which it regularly makes incorrectly, even according to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Requiring a judge to examine the government’s claims when it wants to query its Section 702 databases for Americans’ communications isn’t just a matter of standards: it’s about ensuring government officials don’t get to decide themselves whether they can compromise Americans’ privacy in their most sensitive and intimate communications.

The Government Surveillance Reform Act would prohibit warrantless queries of information collected under Section 702 to find communications or certain information of or about U.S. persons or persons located in the United States. Importantly, this prohibition would also include geolocation information, web browsing, and internet search history.

Holding the Government Accountable

A cornerstone of our legal system is that if someone—including the government—violates your rights, you can use the courts to hold them accountable if you can show that you were affected, i.e. that you have standing.

But, in multiple cases, courts interpreting an evidentiary provision in FISA have prevented Americans who alleged injuries from Section 702 surveillance from obtaining judicial review of the surveillance’s legality. The effect is a one-way ratchet that has “created a broad national-security exception to the Constitution that allows all Americans to be spied upon by their government while denying them any viable means of challenging that spying.”

Section 210 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act would change this. This provision says that if a U.S. person has a reasonable basis to believe that their rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated, they have suffered an “injury in fact” and they have standing to bring their case. It also clarifies that courts should follow FISA’s provision for introducing and weighing evidence of surveillance. These are critical protections in preventing government overreach, and Congress should not reauthorize Section 702 without this provision.

Criminal Notice

Another important safeguard in the American legal system is the right of defendants in criminal cases to know how the evidence against them was obtained and to challenge the legality of how it was collected.

Under FISA as written, the government must disclose when it intends to use evidence it has collected under Section 702 in criminal prosecutions. But in the fifteen years since Congress enacted Section 702, the government has only provided notice to eleven criminal defendants of such intent—and has provided notice to zero defendants in the last five years.

Section 204 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act would clarify that the government is required to notify defendants whenever it would not have had any evidence “but for” Section 702 or other FISA surveillance. This is a common-sense rule, and Congress cannot reauthorize Section 702 without clarifying the government’s duty to disclose evidence collected under Section 702.

Government Surveillance Reform Act

Section 702 expires in December 2023, and Congress should not renew this program without serious consideration of the past abuses of the program and without writing in robust safeguards.

EFF applauds the Government Surveillance Reform Act, which recognizes the need to make these vital reforms, and many more, to Section 702. Requiring court approval of government queries for Americans’ communications in Section 702 databases, allowing Americans who have suffered injuries from Section 702 surveillance to use the evidentiary provisions FISA sets forth, and strengthening the government’s duties to provide notice when using data resulting from Section 702 surveillance in criminal prosecutions must serve as priorities for Congress as it considers reauthorizing Section 702.

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TELL congress: End 702 Absent serious reforms

Today, the Colorado Supreme Court became the first state supreme court in the country to address the constitutionality of a keyword warrant—a digital dragnet tool that allows law enforcement to identify everyone who searched the internet for a specific term or phrase. In a weak and ultimately confusing opinion, the court upheld the warrant, finding the police relied on it in good faith. EFF filed two amicus briefs and was heavily involved in the case.

The case is People v. Seymour, which involved a tragic home arson that killed several people. Police didn’t have a suspect, so they used a keyword warrant to ask Google for identifying information on anyone and everyone who searched for variations on the home’s street address in the two weeks prior to the arson.

Like geofence warrants, keyword warrants cast a dragnet that require a provider to search its entire reserve of user data—in this case, queries by one billion Google users. Police generally have no identified suspects; instead, the sole basis for the warrant is the officer’s hunch that the suspect might have searched for something in some way related to the crime.

Keyword warrants rely on the fact that it is virtually impossible to navigate the modern Internet without entering search queries into a search engine like Google's. By some accounts, there are over 1.15 billion websites, and tens of billions of webpages. Google Search processes as many as 100,000 queries every second. Many users have come to rely on search engines to such a degree that they routinely search for the answers to sensitive or unflattering questions that they might never feel comfortable asking a human confidant, even friends, family members, doctors, or clergy. Over the course of months and years, there is little about a user’s life that will not be reflected in their search keywords, from the mundane to the most intimate. The result is a vast record of some of users’ most private and personal thoughts, opinions, and associations.

In the Seymour opinion, the four-justice majority recognized that people have a constitutionally-protected privacy interest in their internet search queries and that these queries impact a person’s free speech rights. The federal Supreme Court has held that warrants like this one that target speech are highly suspect so courts must apply constitutional search-and-seizure requirements with “scrupulous exactitude.” Despite recognizing this directive to engage in careful, in-depth analysis, the Seymour majority’s reasoning was cursory and at points mistaken. For example, although the court found that the Colorado constitution protects users’ privacy interests in their search queries, it held that the Fourth Amendment does not, due to the third party doctrine, because federal courts have held that there is no expectation of privacy in IP addresses. However, this overlooks the queries themselves, which many courts have suggested are more akin to the location information that was found to be protected in Carpenter v. United States. Similarly, the Colorado court neglected to address the constitutionality of Google’s initial search of all its users’ search queries because it found that the things seized—users’ queries and IP addresses—were sufficiently narrow. Finally, the court merely assumed without deciding that the warrant lacked probable cause, a shortcut that allowed the court to overlook the warrant's facial deficiency and therefore uphold it on the “good faith exception.”

If the majority had truly engaged with the deep constitutional issues presented by this keyword warrant, it would have found, as the three-justices dissenting on this point did, that keyword warrants “are tantamount to a high-tech version of the reviled ‘general warrants’ that first gave rise to the protections in the Fourth Amendment.” They lack probable cause because a mere hunch that some unknown person might have searched for a specific phrase related to the crime is insufficient to support a search of everyone’s search queries, let alone a specific, previously unnamed individual. And keyword warrants are insufficiently particular because they do next to nothing to narrow the universe of the search.

We are disappointed in the result in this case. Keyword warrants not only have the potential to implicate innocent people, they allow the government to target people for sensitive search terms like the drug mifepristone, or the names of gender-affirming healthcare providers, or information about psychedelic drugs. Even searches that refer to crimes or acts of terror are not themselves criminal in all or even most cases (otherwise historians, reporters, and crime novelists could all be subject to criminal investigation). Dragnet warrants that target speech have no place in a democracy, and we will continue to challenge them in the courts and to support legislation to ban them entirely.