With Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act set to expire later this month, the White House recently released a memo objecting to the SAFE Act—legislation introduced by Senators Dick Durbin and Mike Lee that would reauthorize Section 702 with some reforms. The White House is wrong. SAFE is a bipartisan bill that may be our most realistic chance of reforming a dangerous NSA mass surveillance program that even the federal government’s privacy watchdog and the White House itself have acknowledged needs reform.

As we’ve written, the SAFE Act does not go nearly far enough in protecting us from the warrantless surveillance the government now conducts under Section 702. But, with surveillance hawks in the government pushing for a reauthorization of their favorite national security law without any meaningful reforms, the SAFE Act might be privacy and civil liberties advocates’ best hope for imposing some checks upon Section 702.

Section 702 is a serious threat to the privacy of those in the United States. It authorizes the collection of overseas communications for national security purposes, and, in a globalized world, this allows the government to collect a massive amount of Americans’ communications. As Section 702 is currently written, intelligence agencies and domestic law enforcement have backdoor, warrantless access to millions of communications from people with clear constitutional rights.

The White House objects to the SAFE Act’s two major reforms. The first requires the government to obtain court approval before accessing the content of communications for people in the United States which have been hoovered up and stored in Section 702 databases—just like police have to do to read your letters or emails. The SAFE Act’s second reform closes the “data broker loophole” by largely prohibiting the government from purchasing personal data they would otherwise need a warrant to collect. While the White House memo is just the latest attempt to scare lawmakers into reauthorizing Section 702, it omits important context and distorts the key SAFE Act amendments’ effects

The government has repeatedly abused Section 702 by searching its databases for Americans’ communications. Every time, the government claims it has learned from its mistakes and won’t repeat them, only for another abuse to come to light years later. The government asks you to trust it with the enormously powerful surveillance tool that is Section 702—but it has proven unworthy of that trust.

The Government Should Get Judicial Approval Before Accessing Americans’ Communications

Requiring the government to obtain judicial approval before it can access the communications of Americans and those in the United States is a necessary, minimum protection against Section 702’s warrantless surveillance. Because Section 702 does not require safeguards of particularity and probable cause when the government initially collects communications, it is essential to require the government to at least convince a judge that there is a justification before the “separate Fourth Amendment event” of the government accessing the communications of Americans it has collected.

The White House’s memo claims that the government shouldn’t need to get court approval to access communications of Americans that were “lawfully obtained” under Section 702. But this ignores the fundamental differences between Section 702 and other surveillance. Intelligence agencies and law enforcement don’t get to play “finders keepers” with our communications just because they have a pre-existing program that warrantlessly vacuums them all up.

The SAFE Act has exceptions from its general requirement of court approval for emergencies, consent, and—for malicious software—“defensive cybersecurity queries.” While the White House memo claims these are “dangerously narrow,” exigency and consent are longstanding, well-developed exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. And the SAFE Act gives the government even more leeway than the Fourth Amendment ordinarily does in also excluding “defensive cybersecurity queries” from its requirement of judicial approval.

The Government Shouldn’t Be Able to Buy What It Would Otherwise Need a Warrant to Collect

The SAFE Act properly imposes broad restrictions upon the government’s ability to purchase data—because way too much of our data is available for the government to purchase. Both the FBI and NSA have acknowledged knowingly buying data on Americans. As we’ve written many times, the commercially available information that the government purchases can be very revealing about our most intimate, private communications and associations. The Director of National Intelligence’s own report on government purchases of commercially available information recognizes this data can be “misused to pry into private lives, ruin reputations, and cause emotional distress and threaten the safety of individuals.” This report also recognizes that this data can “disclose, for example, the detailed movements and associations of individuals and groups, revealing political, religious, travel, and speech activities.”

The SAFE Act would go a significant way towards closing the “data broker loophole” that the government has been exploiting. Contrary to the White House’s argument that Section 702 reauthorization is “not the vehicle” for protecting Americans’ data privacy, closing the “data broker loophole” goes hand-in-hand with putting crucial guardrails upon Section 702 surveillance: the necessary reform of requiring court approval for government access to Americans’ communications is undermined if the government is able to warrantlessly collect revealing information about Americans some other way. 

The White House further objects that the SAFE Act does not address data purchases by other countries and nongovernmental entities, but this misses the point. The best way Congress can protect Americans’ data privacy from these entities and others is to pass comprehensive data privacy regulation. But, in the context of Section 702 reauthorization, the government is effectively asking for special surveillance permissions for itself, that its surveillance continue to be subjected to minimal oversight while other other countries’ surveillance practices are regulated. (This has been a pattern as of late.) The Fourth Amendment prohibits intelligence agencies and law enforcement from giving themselves the prerogative to invade our privacy.  

Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) is one of the most insidious and secretive mass surveillance authorities still in operation today. The Security and Freedom Enhancement (SAFE) Act would make some much-needed and long fought-for reforms, but it also does not go nearly far enough to rein in a surveillance law that the federal government has abused time and time again.

You can read the full text of the bill here.

While Section 702 was first sold as a tool necessary to stop foreign terrorists, it has since become clear that the government uses the communications it collects under this law as a domestic intelligence source. The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between people overseas on U.S. persons. Now, it’s this US side of digital conversations that are being routinely sifted through by domestic law enforcement agencies—all without a warrant.

The SAFE Act, like other reform bills introduced this Congress, attempts to roll back some of this warrantless surveillance. Despite its glaring flaws and omissions, in a Congress as dysfunctional as this one it might be the bill that best privacy-conscious people and organizations can hope for. For instance, it does not do as much as the Government Surveillance Reform Act, which EFF supported in November 2023. But imposing meaningful checks on the Intelligence Community (IC) is an urgent priority, especially because the Intelligence Community has been trying to sneak a "clean" reauthorization of Section 702 into government funding bills, and has even sought to have the renewal happen in secret in the hopes of keeping its favorite mass surveillance law intact. The administration is also reportedly planning to seek another year-long extension of the law without any congressional action. All the while, those advocating for renewing Section 702 have toyed with as many talking points as they can—from cybercrime or human trafficking to drug smuggling, terrorism, oreven solidarity activism in the United States—to see what issue would scare people sufficiently enough to allow for a clean reauthorization of mass surveillance.

So let’s break down the SAFE Act: what’s good, what’s bad, and what aspects of it might actually cause more harm in the future. 

What’s Good about the SAFE Act

The SAFE Act would do at least two things that reform advocates have pressured Congress to include in any proposed bill to reauthorize Section 702. This speaks to the growing consensus that some reforms are absolutely necessary if this power is to remain operational.

The first and most important reform the bill would make is to require the government to obtain a warrant before accessing the content of communications for people in the United States. Currently, relying on Section 702, the government vacuums up communications from all over the world, and a huge number of those intercepted communications are to or from US persons. Those communications sit in a massive database. Both intelligence agencies and law enforcement have conducted millions of queries of this database for US-based communications—all without a warrant—in order to investigate both national security concerns and run-of-the-mill criminal investigations. The SAFE Act would prohibit “warrantless access to the communications and other information of United States persons and persons located in the United States.” While this is the bare minimum a reform bill should do, it’s an important step. It is crucial to note, however, that this does not stop the IC or law enforcement from querying to see if the government has collected communications from specific individuals under Section 702—it merely stops them from reading those communications without a warrant.

The second major reform the SAFE Act provides is to close the “data brooker loophole,” which EFF has been calling attention to for years. As one example, mobile apps often collect user data to sell it to advertisers on the open market. The problem is law enforcement and intelligence agencies increasingly buy this private user data, rather than obtain a warrant for it. This bill would largely prohibit the government from purchasing personal data they would otherwise need a warrant to collect. This provision does include a potentially significant exception for situations where the government cannot exclude Americans’ data from larger “compilations” that include foreigners’ data. This speaks not only to the unfair bifurcation of rights between Americans and everyone else under much of our surveillance law, but also to the risks of allowing any large scale acquisition from data brokers at all. The SAFE Act would require the government to minimize collection, search, and use of any Americans’ data in these compilations, but it remains to be seen how effective these prohibitions will be. 

What’s Missing from the SAFE Act

The SAFE Act is missing a number of important reforms that we’ve called for—and which the Government Surveillance Reform Act would have addressed. These reforms include ensuring that individuals harmed by warrantless surveillance are able to challenge it in court, both in civil lawsuits like those brought by EFF in the past, and in criminal cases where the government may seek to shield its use of Section 702 from defendants. After nearly 14 years of Section 702 and countless court rulings slamming the courthouse door on such legal challenges, it’s well past time to ensure that those harmed by Section 702 surveillance can have the opportunity to challenge it.

New Problems Potentially Created by the SAFE Act

While there may often be good reason to protect the secrecy of FISA proceedings, unofficial disclosures about these proceedings has from the very beginning played an indispensable role in reforming uncontested abuses of surveillance authorities. From the Bush administration’s warrantless wiretapping program through the Snowden disclosures up to the present, when reporting about FISA applications appears on the front page of the New York Times, oversight of the intelligence community would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, without these disclosures.

Unfortunately, the SAFE Act contains at least one truly nasty addition to current law: an entirely new crime that makes it a felony to disclose “the existence of an application” for foreign intelligence surveillance or any of the application’s contents. In addition to explicitly adding to the existing penalties in the Espionage Act—itself highly controversial— this new provision seems aimed at discouraging leaks by increasing the potential sentence to eight years in prison. There is no requirement that prosecutors show that the disclosure harmed national security, nor any consideration of the public interest. Under the present climate, there’s simply no reason to give prosecutors even more tools like this one to punish whistleblowers who are seen as going through improper channels.

EFF always aims to tell it like it is. This bill has some real improvements, but it’s nowhere near the surveillance reform we all deserve. On the other hand, the IC and its allies in Congress continue to have significant leverage to push fake reform bills, so the SAFE Act may well be the best we’re going to get. Either way, we’re not giving up the fight.  

Imagine a world in which the internet is first and foremost about empowering people, not big corporations and government. In that world, government does “after-action” analyses to make sure its tech regulations are working as intended, recruits experienced technologists as advisors, and enforces real accountability for intelligence and law enforcement programs.

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(You can also find this episode on the Internet Archive and on YouTube.)

Ron Wyden has spent decades working toward that world, first as a congressman and now as Oregon’s senior U.S. Senator. Long among Congress’ most tech-savvy lawmakers, he helped write the law that shaped and protects the internet as we know it, and he has fought tirelessly against warrantless surveillance of Americans’ telecommunications data. Wyden speaks with EFF’s Cindy Cohn and Jason Kelley about his “I squared” —individuals and innovation—legislative approach to foster an internet that benefits everyone. 

In this episode you’ll learn about: 

• How a lot of the worrisome online content that critics blame on Section 230 is actually protected by the First Amendment 
• Requiring intelligence and law enforcement agencies to get warrants before obtaining Americans’ private telecommunications data 
• Why “foreign” is the most important word in “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” 
• Making government officials understand national security isn’t heightened by reducing privacy 
• Protecting women from having their personal data weaponized against them 

U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden, D-OR, has served in the Senate since 1996; he was elected to his current six-year term in 2022. He chairs the Senate Finance Committee, and serves on the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, the Budget Committee, and the Select Committee on Intelligence; he also is the lead Senate Democrat on the Joint Committee on Taxation. His relentless defiance of the national security community's abuse of secrecy forced the declassification of the CIA Inspector General's 9/11 report, shut down the controversial Total Information Awareness program, and put a spotlight on both the Bush and Obama administrations’ reliance on "secret law." In 2006 he introduced the first Senate bill on net neutrality, and in 2011 he was the lone Senator to stand against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), ultimately unsuccessful bills that purportedly were aimed at fighting online piracy but that actually would have caused significant harm to the internet. Earlier, he served from 1981 to 1996 in the House of Representatives, where he co-authored Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996—the law that protects Americans’ freedom of expression online by protecting the intermediaries we all rely on.

Resources: 

• EFF: Sen. Wyden Exposes Data Brokers Selling Location Data to Anti-Abortion Groups That Target Abortion Seekers (Feb. 27, 2024) 
• Just Security: “The Facts About Electronic Surveillance Reform  by U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden  (Jan. 31, 2024) 
• U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden: Wyden Remarks at Section 230 Briefing Hosted by EFF (March 8, 2023) 
• U.S. Supreme Court: Amicus brief of U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden and former Congressman Chris Cox in Gonzalez v. Google regarding Section 230 (January 19, 2023) 
• U.S. Sen Ron Wyden: Wyden Introduces SAFE SEX Workers Study Act (Dec. 17, 2019) 
• EFF's How to Fix the Internet podcast: Safer Sex Work Makes a Safer Internet (April 18, 2023)
• YouTube: DNI Clapper tells Wyden the NSA does not collect data on millions of Americans (March 12, 2013) 
• Washington Post: Interview: Sen. Ron Wyden’s fight to stop SOPA and save the Internet (Jan. 17, 2012)
• Tech Policy Press: Reversal of US Trade Policy Threatens the Free and Open Internet (Nov. 14, 2023) 

 What do you think of “How to Fix the Internet?” Share your feedback here. 

Transcript

SENATOR RON WYDEN
It's been all about two things, individuals and innovation. I call it “I squared,” so to speak, because those my principles. If you kind of follow what I'm trying to do, it's about individuals, it's about innovation. And you know, government has a role in playing to guardrails and ensuring that there are competitive markets. But what I really want to do is empower individuals.

CINDY COHN
That's U.S. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon. He is a political internet pioneer. Since he was first elected to the Senate in 1996, he has fought for personal digital rights, and against corporate and company censorship, and for sensible limits on government secrecy.

[THEME MUSIC BEGINS]

CINDY COHN
I'm Cindy Cohn, the executive director of the Electronic Frontier Foundation.

JASON KELLEY
And I'm Jason Kelley - EFF's Activism Director. This is our podcast series, How to Fix the Internet.

CINDY COHN
The idea behind this show is that we're trying to make our digital lives better. And sometimes when we think about the lawmakers in our country, we often think of the conflict and fighting and people who just don’t get it when it comes to how digital works. But there are also some people in the legislatures who have worked to enact real progress.

JASON KELLEY
Our guest this week is one of the giants in the political fight for internet freedom for several decades now. Senator Wyden played a critical role in the passage of Section 230 — a pillar of online freedom of speech that has recently been coming under attack from many different sides. And he introduced the first Senate net neutrality bill back in 2006. He’s consistently pushed back against mass surveillance and pushed for a strong Fourth Amendment, and over the years, he has consistently fought for many of the things that we are fighting for here at EFF as well.

CINDY COHN
Our conversation takes a look back at some of the major milestones of his career, decisions that have directly impacted all of our online lives. And we talk about the challenges of getting Section 230 passed into law in the first place. But more recently, Senator Wyden also talks about why he was strongly opposed to laws like FOSTA-SESTA, which undermined the space that Section 230 creates for some online speakers, using the cover of trying to stop sex trafficking on the internet.

JASON KELLEY
But like us at EFF, Senator Wyden is focusing on the battles happening right now in Congress that could have a fundamental impact on our online lives. When he was elected in the ‘90s, the focus was on the explosion and rapid expansion of the internet. Now he’s thinking about the rapid expansion of artificial intelligence, and how we can make sure that we put the individual before the profits of corporations when it comes to AI.

CINDY COHN
Our conversation covers a lot of ground but we wanted to start with Senator Wyden’s own view of what a good tech future would look like for all of us.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Well, it's one that empowers the individual. You know, consistently, the battles around here are between big interest groups. And what I want to do is see the individual have more power and big corporations and big government have less as it relates to communications.

CINDY COHN
Yeah. So what would that look like for an ordinary user? What kinds of things might be different?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
What we'd have, for example, is faster adoption of new products and services for people showing greater trust in emergency technologies. We'd build on the motivations that have been behind my privacy bills, the Fourth Amendment Is Not For Sale, for example, Section 230, the Algorithm Accountability Act. Cindy, in each one of these, it's been all about two things: individuals and innovation.

JASON KELLEY
I'm wondering if you're surprised by the way that things have turned out in any specific instance, you know, you had a lot of responsibility for some really important legislation for CDA 230, scaling back some NSA spying issues, helping to stop SOPA-PIPA, which are all, you know, really important to EFF and to a lot of our listeners and supporters. But I'm wondering if, you know, despite that, you've seen surprises in where we are that you didn't expect.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
I didn't expect to have so many opponents across the political spectrum for Section 230. I knew we would have some, but nothing has been the subject of more misinformation than 230. You had Donald Trump, the President of the United States, lying about Section 230 over and over again. I don't think Donald Trump would know what Section 230 was if it hit him in the head, but he was always lying about vote by mail and all those kinds of things.
And huge corporate interests like Big Cable and legacy media have bankrolled massive lobbying and PR campaigns against 230. Since they saw user-created content and the ability of regular people to be heard as a threat to their top-down model, all those big guys have been trying to invent reasons to oppose 230 that I could not have dreamed of.
So I'm not saying, I don't think Chris Cox would say it either, that the law is perfect. But when I think about it, it's really a tool for individuals, people without power, without clout, without lobbies, without big checkbooks. And, uh, you know, a lot of people come up to me and say, "Oh, if you're not in public life, 230 will finally disappear" and all this kind of thing. And I said, I think you're underestimating the power of people to really see what this was all about, which was something very new, a very great opportunity, but still based on a fundamental principle that the individual would be responsible for what they posted in this whole new medium and in the United States individual responsibility carries a lot of weight.

CINDY COHN
Oh, I so agree, and I think that one of the things that we've seen, um, with 230 but with a lot of other things now, is a kind of a correct identification of the harm and a wrong identification of what's causing it or what will solve it. So, you know, there are plenty of problems online, but, um, I think we feel, and I think it sounds like you do as well, that we're playing this funny little whack-a-mole game where whatever the problem is, somebody's sliding in to say that 230 is the reason they have that problem, when a lot of times it has to do with something, you know, not related. It could even be, in many cases, the U. S. Constitution, but also kind of misindentifying –

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Cindy, there's a great story that I sometimes tell. The New York Times one day had a big picture of Chris Cox and I, it was practically a full-length page. I'm 6'4", went to college on a basketball scholarship dreaming of playing in the NBA, and they said “these two people are responsible for all the hate information online and 230 empowered people to do it.” And we hardly ever do this, but Keith Chu, our wonderful expert on all things technology, finally touched base with him and said, "you know that if there was no 230, over 95 percent of what we see online that we really dislike — you know, misogyny, hate speech, racism — would still be out there because of the First Amendment, not 230."
And the New York Times, to its credit, printed a long, long apology essentially the next day, making the case that that was really all about the First Amendment, not 230. 230 brought added kind of features to this, particularly the capacity to moderate, which was so important in a new opportunity to communicate.

[MUSIC FADES IN]

CINDY COHN
What drives you towards building a better internet? So many people in Congress in your town don't really take the time to figure out what's going on, much less propose real solutions. They kind of, you know, we've been in this swing where they, they treated the technologies like heroes and now we're in a time when they're treating them like villains. But what drives you to, to kind of figure out what's actually going on and propose real solutions?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
I showed up, Cindy, Oregon's first new United States senator in 34 years, in 1996, the winner, and the only person who knew how to use a computer at that point was, uh, Pat Leahy, who was a great advocate of technology and, and innovation. I said, "I'm going to get into new stuff." In other words, Oregon had always been about wood products. We always will be about wood products and I will continue to champion those kinds of practices, particularly now we're working to prevent these huge fires. I also said we're going to get into new things. And my dad was a journalist and he said, "You're not doing your job if you don't ask hard questions every single day."
So what we tried to do, particularly in those first days, is kind of lay the foundation, just do the foundational principles for the internet. I mean, there's a book, Jeff Kossoff wrote “26 Words That Created the Internet,” but we also had internet tax policy to promote non-discrimination, so you wouldn't be treated different online than you would be offline.
Our digital signatures law, I think, has been a fabulous, you know, addition. People used to spend hours and hours in offices, you know, kind of signing these documents that look like five phone books stacked on top of each other, and they'd be getting through it in 15, 20 minutes. So, um, to me, what I think we showed is that you could produce more genuine innovation by thinking through what was to come than just lining the pocketbooks of these big entrenched interests. Now, a big part of what we're going to have to do now with AI is go through some of those same kinds of issues. You know, I think for example, we're all in on beating China. That's important. We're all in on innovation, but we've got to make sure that we cement bedrock, you know, privacy and accountability.
And that's really what's behind the Algorithm Accountability Act because, you know, what we wanted to do when people were getting ripped off in terms of housing and education and the like with AI, we wanted to get them basic protection.

JASON KELLEY
It sounds like you're, you know, you're already thinking about this new thing, AI, and in 20 or more years ago, you were thinking about the new thing, which is posting online. How do we get more of your colleagues to sort of have that same impulse to be interested in tackling those hard questions that you mentioned? I think we always wonder what's missing from their views, and we just don't really know how to make them sort of wake up to the things that you get.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
What we do is particularly focus on getting experienced and knowledgeable and effective staff. I tell people I went to school on a basketball scholarship. I remember recruiting, we kind of recruit our technologists like they were all LeBron James, and kind of talking about, you know, why there were going to be opportunities here. And we have just a terrific staff now, really led by Chris Segoyan and Keith Chu.
And it's paid huge dividends, for example, when we look at some of these shady data broker issues, government surveillance. Now, with the passing of my, my friend Dianne Feinstein,  one of the most senior members in the intelligence field and, uh,  these incredibly good staff allow me to get into these issues right now I'm with Senator Moran, Jerry Moran of Kansas trying to upend the declassification system because it basically doesn't declassify anything and I'm not sure they could catch bad guys, and they certainly are hanging on to stuff that is irresponsible, uh, information collection about innocent people.

[SHORT MUSIC INTERLUDE]

CINDY COHN
These are all problems that, of course, we're very deep in and,  we do appreciate that you, you know, our friend, Chris Segoyan,  who EFF's known for a long time and other people you've brought in really good technologists and people who understand technology to advise you. How do we get more senators to do that too? Are there things that we could help build that would make that easier?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
I think there are, and I think we need to do more, not post-mortems, but sort of more after-action kind of analysis. For example, the vote on SESTA-FOSTA was 98 to 2. And everybody wasn't sure where the other vote was, and Rand Paul came up to me and said, "You're right, so I'm voting with you."
And, uh, the point really was, you know, everybody hated the scourge of sex trafficking and the like. I consider those people monsters. But I pointed out that all you're going to do is drive them from a place where there was transparency to the dark web, where you can't get a search engine. And people go, "Huh? Well, Ron's telling us, you know, that it's going to get worse." And then I offered an amendment to basically do what I think would have really made a difference there, which is get more prosecutors and more investigators going after bad guys. And the ultimate factor that would be good, as I say, to have these sort of after-action, after-legislating kind of things, is everybody said, "Well, you know, you've got to have SESTA-FOSTA, or you're never going to be able to do anything about Backpage. This was this horrible place that, you know, there were real problems with respect to sex trafficking. And what happened was, Backpage was put out of business under existing law, not under SESTA-FOSTA, and when you guys have this discussion with, you know, people who are following the program and ask them, ask them when their senator or congressperson last had a press conference about SESTA-FOSTA.
I know the answer to this. I can't find a single press conference about SESTA-FOSTA, which was ballyhooed at the time as this miraculous cure for dealing with really bad guys, and the technology didn't make sense and the education didn't make sense, and the history with Backpage didn't make any sense and it's because people got all intoxicated with these, you know, ideas that somehow they were going to be doing this wondrous, you know, thing and it really made things worse.

CINDY COHN
So I'm hearing three things in the better world. One, and the one you've just mentioned, is that we actually have real accountability, that when we pass some kind of regulation, we take the time to look back and see whether it worked; that we have informed people who are helping advise or actually are the lawmakers and the regulators who understand how things, uh, really work.
And the third one is that we have a lot more accountability inside government around classification and secrecy, especially around things involving, you know, national security. And, you know, you're in this position, right, where you are read in as a member of the Intelligence Committee. So you kind of see what the rest of us don't. And I'm wondering, obviously I don't want you to reveal anything, but you know, are there, is that gap an important one that we close?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Yeah, I mean, you know, there have been a lot of 14-to-1 votes in the Intelligence Committee over the, over the years, and, you know, I've been the one, and you know, the reality is people often get swept up in these kinds of arguments, particularly from people in government, like, we're having a big debate about surveillance now, Section 702, and, you know, everybody's saying, "Ron, what are you talking about? You're opposing this, you know, we face all these, all these kinds of, kinds of threats," and, um, you know, what I've always said is, read the title of the bill, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, that means we're worried about foreign intelligence, we're not, under that law supposed to be sweeping up the records of vast numbers of Americans who are interconnected to those foreign individuals by virtue of the fact that communication systems have changed.
And I personally believe that smart policies ensure that you can fight terror ferociously while still protecting civil liberties, and not-so-smart policies give you less of both.

JASON KELLEY
How do we get to that balance that you're talking about, where, you know, I know a lot of people feel like we do have to have some level of surveillance to protect national security, but that balance of protecting the individual rights of people is a complicated one. And I'm wondering how you think about what that looks like for people.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Well, for example, Zoe Lofgren, you know, Zoe has been a partner of mine on many projects. I know she's been sympathetic with all of you all, well, for many years in her service as a member from California. You know, what we said on our 702 reforms, and by the way, we had a whole bunch of Republicans, there needs to be a warrant requirement. If you're going after the personal data of Americans, there should be a warrant requirement.

Now, we were then asked, "Well, what happens if it's some kind of imminent kind of crisis?" And I said, what I've always said is that all my bills, as it relates to surveillance, have a warrant exception, which is if the government believes that there is an imminent threat to the security of our country and our people, the government can go up immediately and come back and settle the warrant matter afterwards. And at one point I was having a pretty vigorous debate with the President and his people, then-President Obama. And I said, "Mr. President, if the warrant requirement exception isn't written right, you all write it and I'm sure we'll work it out."
But I think that giving the government a wide berth to make an assessment about whether there is a real threat to the country and they're prepared to not only go up immediately to get the information, but to trust the process later on to come back and show that it was warranted. I think it's a fair balance. That's the kind of thing I'm working on right now.

JASON KELLEY
Let’s pause for just a moment to say thank you to our sponsor. “How to Fix the Internet” is supported by The Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Program in Public Understanding of Science and Technology. Enriching people’s lives through a keener appreciation of our increasingly technological world and portraying the complex humanity of scientists, engineers, and mathematicians.
And now back to our conversation with Senator Ron Wyden and his work on privacy laws.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Really, the first big law that I got passed involved privacy rights of Americans outside the country. So we had won a bunch of battles before that, you know, defeating John Poindexter, Total Information Awareness, and a variety of other battles.
But when I started this, trying to protect the privacy rights of Americans who are outside the United States, you would have thought that Western civilization was going to end. And this was the Bush administration. And the DNI, the head of national intelligence, talked to me. He said, "Ron, this is just going to be disastrous. It's going to be horrible."
And I walked him through who we were talking about. And I said, the biggest group of people we're talking about are men and women who wear the uniform in the United States because they are outside the United States. You can't possibly be telling me, Director McConnell, it was Director McConnell at that time, that they shouldn't have privacy rights. And then things kind of moved and I kept working with them and they still said that this was going to be a tremendous threat and all the rest. They were going to veto it. They actually put out a statement about there would be a veto message. So I worked with them a little bit more and we worked it out. And when we were done, the Bush administration put out something, and we are proud to say that we are protecting the privacy rights of Americans outside the United States.
So, if you can just take enough time and be persistent enough, you can get things done. And now, we actually have elected officials and presidents of both political parties all taking credit for the privacy rights of people outside the United States.

[MUSIC STING COMES IN TO INTRO CLIP]

SENATOR RON WYDEN ON CSPAN
A yes or no answer to the question, does the NSA collect any type of data at all on millions or hundreds of millions of Americans?

JAMES CLAPPER ON CSPAN
No sir.

SENATOR RON WYDEN ON CSPAN
It does not.

JAMES CLAPPER ON CSPAN
Not wittingly. There are cases where they could inadvertantly, perhaps, collect but not, not wittingly.

CINDY COHN
That's a clip from CSPAN, a pretty famous interaction you had with James Clapper in 2013. But I think the thing that really shines through with you is your ability to walk this fine line — you're very respectful of the system, even in an instance like this where someone is lying under oath right in your face, you know you have to work within the system to make change. How do you navigate that in the face of lies and misdirection?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Well, you have to take the time to really tee it up, and I really credit John Dickus of Oregon, our staffer at the time, did a phenomenal job. He spent about six months teeing that question up for Mr. Clapper and what happened is his deputy — Mr. Clapper's deputy, Keith Alexander — had been telling what my 11-year-old daughter — my wife and I are older parents — we have this 11-year-old. She said, "Dad, that was a big whopper. That guy told a big whopper." Keith Alexander told a bunch of whoppers. And then Mr. Clapper did. And this had all been done in public. And so we asked for answers. He wouldn't give any answers. Then he came to the one, um, you know, open-threat hearing that we have each year. And we prepare for those open threat hearings like there is no tomorrow, because you don't get very many opportunities to have a chance to ask, you know, the important questions. And so John Dickus sent to Mr. Clapper, he sent him the question a day in advance, so that nobody could say that they hadn't gotten it, and it's an informal rule in the Intelligence Committee that if an official feels that they can't answer, they just say, "I can't answer, I have to do it in private." I wouldn't have liked that answer. But I would have respected it and tried to figure out some other way, but James Clapper got the question, looked at the camera, looked at me, and just lied and persisted in coming up — he had like five or six excuses for how he wasn't lying. And I think as the country found out what was going on, it was a big part of our product to produce the next round of laws that provided some scrutiny over the Patriot Act.

CINDY COHN
I think that's a really important kind of insight, right? Which is the thing that led to people being upset about the kind of massive surveillance and understanding it was kind of the lie, right? Like if there was more transparency on the part of the national security people and they didn't just tell themselves that they have to lie to all the rest of us, you know, in order to keep us safe, which I think is a very, very dangerous story in a democracy, we might end up in a much more reasonable place for everyone about privacy and security. And I actually don't think it's a balance. I think that you only get security if you have privacy, rather than they have to be traded off against them, and –

SENATOR RON WYDEN
You're a Ben Franklin person, Cindy. Anybody who gives up liberty to have security doesn't deserve either.

CINDY COHN
Well, I think that that's kind of right, but I also think that, you know, the history has shown that the intense secrecy, overbroad secrecy actually doesn't make us safer. And I think this goes back to your point about accountability, where we really do need to look back and say these things that have been embraced as allegedly making us safer, are they actually making us safer or are we better off having a different role for secrecy — not that there's no role, but then the one that has been, you know, kind of, it's an all-purpose excuse that no matter what the government does, it just uses the secrecy argument to make sure that the American people can't find out so that we don't, you know, evaluate whether things are working or not.
I just don't think that the, you know, my experience watching these things, and I don't know about yours, is that the overblown secrecy isn't actually making us safer.

[SHORT MUSIC INTERLUDE]

JASON KELLEY
Before we wrap up, we wanted to get a sense from you of what issues you see coming in the next three years or so that we're going to need to be thinking about to be ahead of the game. What's at the top of your mind looking forward?

SENATOR RON WYDEN
The impact of the Dobbs decision repealing Roe v. Wade is going to have huge ripple effects through our society. I believe, you know, women are already having their personal information weaponized. against them. And you're seeing it in states with, you know, MAGA attorneys general, but you're also seeing it – we did a big investigation of pharmacies. And pharmacies are giving out women's personal information hither and, and yon. And, you know, we're very much committed to getting privacy rights here. And I also want to congratulate EFF on your Who's Got Your Back report, because you really are touching on these same kinds of issues, and I think getting a warrant ought to be really important.
And the other one I mentioned is, uh, fighting government censorship. And I would put that both at home and abroad. It's no secret that China, Russia, and India want to control what people can say and read, but you know, if you look at some of what, you know, we're seeing in this country, the U.S. trade representative taking a big step backwards in terms of access to information, we're going to have to deal with that in here in our country too.

CINDY COHN
Oh, those are wonderful and scary, but wonderful and important things. I really appreciate you taking the time to talk to us. It's always such a pleasure and we are huge fans of the work that you've done, and thank you so much for carrying, you know, the “I squared,” individuals and innovation. Those are two values close to our hearts here at EFF and we really appreciate having you in Congress championing that as well

SENATOR RON WYDEN
I don't want to make this a bouquet-tossing contest, but we've had a lot of opportunities to work, work together and, you know, EFF is part of the Steppin' Up Caucus and, uh, really appreciate it and, uh, let's put this in "to be continued," okay?

CINDY COHN
Terrific.

SENATOR RON WYDEN
Thanks, guys.

CINDY COHN
I really could talk with Senator Wyden all day and specifically talk with him about national security all day, but what a great conversation. And it's so refreshing to have somebody who's experienced in Congress who really is focusing on two of the most important things that EFF focuses on as well. I love the framing of I squared, right? Individuals and innovation as the kind of centerpiece of a better world.

JASON KELLEY
Yeah. And you know, he's not just saying it, it's clear from his bills and his work over the years that he really does center those things. Innovation and individuals are really the core of things like Section 230 and many other pieces of legislation that he's worked on, which, it's just really nice and refreshing to hear someone who has a really strong ethos in the Senate and has the background to show that he means it.

CINDY COHN
Yeah, and you know, sometimes we disagree with Senator Wyden, but it's always refreshing to feel like, well, we're all trying to point in the same direction. We sometimes have disagreements about how to get there.

JASON KELLEY
Yeah. And one of the great things about working with him is that, you know, he and his staff are tech-savvy, so our disagreements are often pretty nuanced, at least from what I can remember. You know, we aren't having disagreements about what a technology is or something like that very often. I think we're, we're usually having really good conversations with his folks, because he's one of the most tech-savvy staffers in the Senate, and he's helped really make the Senate more tech-savvy overall.

CINDY COHN
Yeah, I think that this is one of these pieces of a better internet that, that feels kind of indirect, but is actually really important, which is making sure that our lawmakers - you know, they don't all have to be technologists. We have a couple technologists in Congress now, but they really have to be informed by people who understand how technology works.
And I think one of the things that's important when we show up a lot of the times is really, you know, having a clear ability to explain to the people, you know, whether it's the congressional people themselves or their staff, like how things really work and having that kind of expertise in house is, I think, something that's going to be really important if we're going to get to a better internet.

JASON KELLEY
Yeah. And it's clear that we have still work to do. You know, he brought up SESTA-FOSTA and that's an instance where, you know, he understands and his staff understands that that was a bad bill, but it was still, as he said, you know, 98-2, when it came to the vote. And ultimately that was a tech bill. And I think if, if we had more, even more sort of tech-savvy folks, we wouldn't have had such a such a fight with that bill.

CINDY COHN
And I think that he also pointed to something really important, which was this idea of after analysis, after-action thinking and looking back and saying, "Well, we passed this thing, did it do what we had hoped it would do?" as a way to really have a process where we can do error correction. And I noted that, you know, Ro Khanna and Elizabeth Warren have actually, and Senator Wyden, have floated a bill to have an investigation into FOSTA-SESTA, which, you know, for, for those who, who don't know the shorthand, this was a way that Section 230 was cut back, and protection was cut back. And the idea is that it could help stop sex trafficking. Well, all the data that we've seen so far is that it did not do that. And in some ways made sex trafficking,  you know, in the offline environment more dangerous. But having Congress actually step in and do and sponsor the research to figure out whether the bill that Congress passed did the thing that they said is, I think, just a critical piece of how we decide what we're going to do in order to protect individuals and innovation online.

JASON KELLEY
Yeah. For me, you know, it's actually tied to something that I know a lot of tech teams do which is like a sort of post-mortem. You know, after something happens, you really do need to investigate how we got there, what worked and what didn't, but in this case we all know, at least at EFF, that this was a bad bill.

CINDY COHN
Yeah, I mean, sometimes it might be just taking what we know anecdotally and turning it into something that Congress can more easily see and digest. Um, I think the other thing, it's just impossible to talk with or about Senator Wyden without talking about national security because he has just been heroic in his efforts to try to make sure that we don't trade privacy off for security. And that we recognize that these two things are linked and that by lifting up privacy, we're lifting up national security.
And by reducing privacy, we're not actually making ourselves safer. And he really has done more for this. And I think what was heartening about this conversation was that, you know, he talked about how he convinced national security hawks to support something that stood with privacy, this story about kind of really talking about how most of the Americans abroad are affiliated in one way or another with the U.S. military, people who are stationed abroad and their families, and how standing up for their privacy and framing it that way, you know, ultimately led to some success for this. Now, we've got a long ways to go, and I think he'd be the first one to agree. But the kind of doggedness and willingness to be in there for the long haul and talk to the national security folks about how, how these two values support each other is something that he has really proven that he's willing to do and it's so important.

JASON KELLEY
Yeah, that's exactly right, I think, as well. And it's also terrific that he's looking to the future, you know, we do know that he's thinking about these things, you know, 702 has been an issue for a long time and he's still focused on it, but what did you think of his thoughts about what our coming challenges are — things like how to deal with data in in a post-Dobbs world, for example?

CINDY COHN
Oh, I think he's right on, right on it. He's recognizing, I think as a lot of people have, that the Dobbs decision, overturning Roe v. Wade has really made it clear to a lot of people how vulnerable we are, based upon the data that we have to leave behind in what we do every day. Now you can do things to try to protect them, but there's only so much we can do right now without changes in the law and changes in the way things go because you know, your phone needs to know where you are in order to ring when somebody calls you or ping when somebody texts you.
So we need legal answers and he's correct that this is really coming into the fore right now. I think he's also thinking about the challenges that artificial intelligence are bringing. So I really appreciate that he's already thinking about how we fix the internet, you know, in the coming years, not just right now.

JASON KELLEY
I'm really glad we had this bouquet-throwing contest, I think was what he called it. Something like that. But yeah, I think it's great to have an ally and have them be in the Senate and I know he feels the same way about us.

CINDY COHN
Oh, absolutely. I mean, you know, part of the way we get to a better internet is to recognize the people who are doing the right thing. And so, you know, we spend a lot of time at EFF throwing rocks at the people who are doing the wrong thing. And that's really important too. But occasionally, you know, we get to throw some bouquets to the people who are fighting the good fight.

[THEME MUSIC FADES IN]

JASON KELLEY

Thanks for joining us for this episode of How To Fix the Internet.
If you have feedback or suggestions, we'd love to hear from you. Visit EFF.org/podcast and click on listener feedback. While you're there, you can become a member, donate, maybe pick up some merch and just see what's happening in digital rights this week and every week.
We’ve got a newsletter, EFFector, as well as social media accounts on many, many, many platforms.
This podcast is licensed Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International, and includes music licensed Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported by their creators.
In this episode you heard Kalte Ohren by Alex and Drops of H10 (The Filtered Water Treatment) by J. Lang
Our theme music is by Nat Keefe of BeatMower with Reed Mathis
How to Fix the Internet is supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation's program in public understanding of science and technology.
We’ll talk to you again soon.
I’m Jason Kelley.

CINDY COHN
And I’m Cindy Cohn.

Welcome! 

The fact that you’re reading this means that you probably care deeply about the issue of privacy, which warms our hearts. Unfortunately, even though you care about privacy, or perhaps because you care so much about it, you may feel that there's not much you (or anyone) can really do to protect it, no matter how hard you try. Perhaps you think “privacy is dead.” 

We’ve all probably felt a little bit like you do at one time or another. At its worst, this feeling might be described as despair. Maybe it hits you because a new privacy law seems to be too little, too late. Or maybe you felt a kind of vertigo after reading a news story about a data breach or a company that was vacuuming up private data willy-nilly without consent. 

People are angry because they care about privacy, not because privacy is dead.

Even if you don’t have this feeling now, at some point you may have felt—or possibly will feel—that we’re past the point of no return when it comes to protecting our private lives from digital snooping. There are so many dangers out there—invasive governments, doorbell cameras, license plate readers, greedy data brokers, mismanaged companies that haven’t installed any security updates in a decade. The list goes on.

This feeling is sometimes called “privacy nihilism.” Those of us who care the most about privacy are probably more likely to get it, because we know how tough the fight is. 

We could go on about this feeling, because sometimes we at EFF have it, too. But the important thing to get across is that this feeling is valid, but it’s also not accurate. Here’s why.

You Aren’t Fighting for Privacy Alone

For starters, remember that none of us are fighting alone. EFF is one of dozens, if not hundreds,  of organizations that work to protect privacy.  EFF alone has over thirty-thousand dues-paying members who support that fight—not to mention hundreds of thousands of supporters subscribed to our email lists and social media feeds. Millions of people read EFF’s website each year, and tens of millions use the tools we’ve made, like Privacy Badger. Privacy is one of EFF’s biggest concerns, and as an organization we have grown by leaps and bounds over the last two decades because more and more people care. Some people say that Americans have given up on privacy. But if you look at actual facts—not just EFF membership, but survey results and votes cast on ballot initiatives—Americans overwhelmingly support new privacy protections. In general, the country has grown more concerned about how the government uses our data, and a large majority of people say that we need more data privacy protections. 

People are angry because they care about privacy, not because privacy is dead.

Some people also say that kids these days don’t care about their privacy, but the ones that we’ve met think about privacy a lot. What’s more, they are fighting as hard as anyone to stop privacy-invasive bills like the Kids Online Safety Act. In our experience, the next generation cares intensely about protecting privacy, and they’re likely to have even more tools to do so. 

Laws are Making Their Way Around the World

Strong privacy laws don’t cover every American—yet. But take a look at just one example to see how things are improving: the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA). The CCPA isn’t perfect, but it did make a difference. The CCPA granted Californians a few basic rights when it comes to their relationship with businesses, like the right to know what information companies have about you, the right to delete that information, and the right to tell companies not to sell your information. 

This wasn’t a perfect law for a few reasons. Under the CCPA, consumers have to go company-by-company to opt out in order to protect their data. At EFF, we’d like to see privacy and protection as the default until consumers opt-in. Also, CCPA doesn’t allow individuals to sue if their data is mismanaged—only California’s Attorney General and the California Privacy Protection Agency can do it. And of course, the law only covers Californians. 

Remember that it takes time to change the system.

But this imperfect law is slowly getting better. Just this year California’s legislature passed the DELETE Act, which resolves one of those issues. The California Privacy Protection Agency now must create a deletion mechanism for data brokers that allows people to make their requests to every data broker with a single, verifiable consumer request. 

Pick a privacy-related topic, and chances are good that model bills are being introduced, or already exist as laws in some places, even if they don’t exist everywhere. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act, for example, passed back in 2008, protects people from nonconsensual use of their biometrics for face recognition. We may not have comprehensive privacy laws yet in the US, but other parts of the world—like Europe—have more impactful, if imperfect, laws. We can have a nationwide comprehensive consumer data privacy law, and once those laws are on the books, they can be improved.  

We Know We’re Playing the Long Game

Remember that it takes time to change the system. Today we take many protections for granted, and often assume that things are only getting worse, not better. But many important rights are relatively new. For example, our Constitution didn’t always require police to get a warrant before wiretapping our phones. It took the Supreme Court four decades to get this right. (They were wrong in 1928 in Olmstead, then right in 1967 in Katz.)

Similarly, creating privacy protections in law and in technology is not a sprint. It is a marathon. The fight is long, and we know that. Below, we’ve got examples of the progress that we’ve already made, in law and elsewhere. 

Just because we don’t have some protective laws today doesn’t mean we can’t have them tomorrow. 

Privacy Protections Have Actually Increased Over the Years

The World Wide Web is Now Encrypted 

When the World Wide Web was created, most websites were unencrypted. Privacy laws aren’t the only way to create privacy protections, as the now nearly-entirely encrypted web shows:  another approach is to engineer in strong privacy protections from the start. 

The web has now largely switched from non-secure HTTP to the more secure HTTPS protocol. Before this happened, most web browsing was vulnerable to eavesdropping and content hijacking. HTTPS fixes most of these problems. That's why EFF, and many like-minded supporters, pushed for web sites to adopt HTTPS by default. As of 2021, about 90% of all web page visits use HTTPS. This switch happened in under a decade. This is a big win for encryption and security for everyone, and EFF's Certbot and HTTPS Everywhere are tools that made it happen, by offering an easy and free way to switch an existing HTTP site to HTTPS. (With a lot of help from Let’s Encrypt, started in 2013 by a group of determined researchers and technologists from EFF and the University of Michigan.) Today, it’s the default to implement HTTPS. 

Cell Phone Location Data Now Requires a Warrant

In 2018, the Supreme Court handed down a landmark opinion in Carpenter v. United States, ruling 5-4 that the Fourth Amendment protects cell phone location information. As a result, police must now get a warrant before obtaining this data. 

But where else this ruling applies is still being worked out. Perhaps the most significant part of the ruling is its explicit recognition that individuals can maintain an expectation of privacy in information that they provide to third parties. The Court termed that a “rare” case, but it’s clear that other invasive surveillance technologies, particularly those that can track individuals through physical space, are now ripe for challenge. Expect to see much more litigation on this subject from EFF and our friends.

Americans’ Outrage At Unconstitutional Mass Surveillance Made A Difference

In 2013, government contractor Edward Snowden shared evidence confirming, among other things, that the United States government had been conducting mass surveillance on a global scale, including surveillance of its own citizens’ telephone and internet use. Ten years later, there is definitely more work to be done regarding mass surveillance. But some things are undoubtedly better: some of the National Security Agency’s most egregiously illegal programs and authorities have shuttered or been forced to end. The Intelligence Community has started affirmatively releasing at least some important information, although EFF and others have still had to fight some long Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) battles.

Privacy Options Are So Much Better Today

Remember PGP and GPG? If you do, you know that generally, there are much easier ways to send end-to-end encrypted communications today than there used to be. It’s fantastic that people worked so hard to protect their privacy in the past, and it’s fantastic that they don’t have to work as hard now! (If you aren’t familiar with PGP or GPG, just trust us on this one.) 

Don’t give in to privacy nihilism. Instead, share and celebrate the ways we’re winning. 

Advice for protecting online privacy used to require epic how-to guides for complex tools; now, advice is usually just about what relatively simple tools or settings to use. People across the world have Signal and WhatsApp. The web is encrypted, and the Tor Browser lets people visit websites anonymously fairly easily. Password managers protect your passwords and your accounts; third-party cookie blockers like EFF’s Privacy Badger stop third-party tracking. There are even options now to turn off your Ad ID—the key that enables most third-party tracking on mobile devices—right on your phone. These tools and settings all push the needle forward.

We Are Winning The Privacy War, Not Losing It

Sometimes people respond to privacy dangers by comparing them to sci-fi dystopias. But be honest: most science fiction dystopias still scare the heck out of us because they are much, much more invasive of privacy than the world we live in. 

In an essay called “Stop Saying Privacy Is Dead,” Evan Selinger makes a necessary point: “As long as you have some meaningful say over when you are watched and can exert agency over how your data is processed, you will have some modicum of privacy.” 

Of course we want more than a modicum of privacy. But the point here is that many of us generally do get to make decisions about our privacy. Not all—of course. But we all recognize that there are different levels of privacy in different places, and that privacy protections aren’t equally good or bad no matter where we go. We have places we can go—online and off—that afford us more protections than others. And because of this, most of the people reading this still have deep private lives, and can choose, with varying amounts of effort, not to allow corporate or government surveillance into those lives. 

Worrying about every potential threat, and trying to protect yourself from each of them, all of the time, is a recipe for failure.

Privacy is a process, not a single thing. We are always negotiating what levels of privacy we have. We might not always have the upper hand, but we are often able to negotiate. This is why we still see some fictional dystopias and think, “Thank God that’s not my life.” As long as we can do this, we are winning. 

“Giving Up” On Privacy May Not Mean Much to You, But It Does to Many

Shrugging about the dangers of surveillance can seem reasonable when that surveillance isn’t very impactful on our lives. But for many, fighting for privacy isn't a choice, it is a means to survive. Privacy inequity is real; increasingly, money buys additional privacy protections. And if privacy is available for some, then it can exist for all. But we should not accept that some people will have privacy and others will not. This is why digital privacy legislation is digital rights legislation, and why EFF is opposed to data dividends and pay-for-privacy schemes.

Privacy increases for all of us when it increases for each of us. It is much easier for a repressive government to ban end-to-end encrypted messengers when only journalists and activists use them. It is easier to know who is an activist or a journalist when they are the only ones using privacy-protecting services or methods. As the number of people demanding privacy increases, the safer we all are. Sacrificing others because you don't feel the impact of surveillance is a fool's bargain. 

Time Heals Most Privacy Wounds

You may want to tell yourself: companies already know everything about me, so a privacy law a year from now won't help. That's incorrect, because companies are always searching for new data. Some pieces of information will never change, like our biometrics. But chances are you've changed in many ways over the years—whether that's as big as a major life event or as small as a change in your tastes in movies—but who you are today is not necessarily you'll be tomorrow.

As the source of that data, we should have more control over where it goes, and we’re slowly getting it. But that expiration date means that even if some of our information is already out there, it’s never going to be too late to shut off the faucet. So if we pass a privacy law next year, it’s not the case that every bit of information about you has already leaked, so it won’t do any good. It will.

What To Do When You Feel Like It’s Impossible

It can feel overwhelming to care about something that feels like it’s dying a death of a thousand cuts. But worrying about every potential threat, and trying to protect yourself from each of them, all of the time, is a recipe for failure. No one really needs to be vigilant about every threat at all times. That’s why our recommendation is to create a personalized security plan, rather than throwing your hands up or cowering in a corner. 

Once you’ve figured out what threats you should worry about, our advice is to stay involved. We are all occasionally skeptical that we can succeed, but taking action is a great way to get rid of that gnawing feeling that there’s nothing to be done. EFF regularly launches new projects that we hope will help you fight privacy nihilism. We’re in court many times a year fighting privacy violations. We create ways for like-minded, privacy-focused people to work together in their local advocacy groups, through the Electronic Frontier Alliance, our grassroots network of community and campus organizations fighting for digital rights. We even help you teach others to protect their own privacy. And of course every day is a good day for you to join us in telling government officials and companies that privacy matters. 

We know we can win because we’re creating the better future that we want to see every day, and it’s working. But we’re also building the plane while we’re flying it. Just as the death of privacy is not inevitable, neither is our success. It takes real work, and we hope you’ll help us do that work by joining us. Take action. Tell a friend. Download Privacy Badger. Become an EFF member. Gift an EFF membership to someone else.

Don’t give in to privacy nihilism. Instead, share and celebrate the ways we’re winning. 

Earlier this week, both the House Committee on the Judiciary (HJC) and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) marked up two very different bills (H.R. 6570 - Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act in HJC, and HR 6611, the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023 in HPSCI), both of which would reauthorize Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)—but in very different ways. Both bills head to the House floor next week under a procedural rule called “Queen of the Hill,” where the bill with the most votes gets sent to the Senate for consideration. 

While renewing any surveillance authority remains a complicated and complex issue, this choice is clear - we urge all Members to vote NO on the Intelligence Committee’s bill, H.R.6611, the FISA Reform and Reauthorization Act of 2023.

Take action

TELL congress: Defeat this bad 702 Bill

On Nov. 16, HPSCI released a report calling for reauthorization of Section 702 with essentially superficial reforms. The bill that followed, H.R. 6611, was as bad as expected. It would renew the mass surveillance authority Section 702 for another eight years. It would create new authorities that the intelligence community has sought for years, but that have been denied by the courts. It would continue the indiscriminate collection of U.S. persons’ communications when they talk with people abroad for use by domestic law enforcement. This was not the intention of this national security program, and people on U.S. soil should not have their communications collected without a warrant because of a loophole.

As a reminder, Section 702 was designed to allow the government to warrantlessly surveil non-U.S. citizens abroad for foreign intelligence purposes. Increasingly, it’s this U.S. side of digital conversations that domestic law enforcement agencies trawl through—all without a warrant. FBI agents have been using the Section 702 databases to conduct millions of invasive searches for Americans’ communications, including those of protesters, racial justice activists, 19,000 donors to a congressional campaign, journalists, and even members of Congress. 

Additionally, the HPSCI bill authorizes the use of this unaccountable and out-of-control mass surveillance program as a new way of vetting asylum seekers by sifting through their digital communications. According to a newly released Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinion, the government has sought some version of this authority for years, but was repeatedly denied it, only receiving court approval for the first time this year. Because the court opinion is so heavily redacted, it is impossible to know the current scope of immigration- and visa-related querying, or what broader proposal the intelligence agencies originally sought. 

This new authority proposes to give immigration services the ability to audit entire communication histories before deciding whether an immigrant can enter the country. This is a particularly problematic situation that could cost someone entrance to the United States based on, for instance, their own or a friend’s political opinions—as happened to a Palestinian Harvard student when his social media account was reviewed when coming to the U.S. to start his semester.

The HPSCI bill also includes a call “to define Electronic Communication Service Provider to include equipment.” Earlier this year, the FISA Court of Review released a highly redacted opinion documenting a fight over the government's attempt to subject an unknown company to Section 702 surveillance. However, the court agreed that under the circumstances the company did not qualify as an "electronic communication service provider" under the law. Now, the HPSCI bill would expand that definition to include a much broader range of providers, including those who merely provide hardware through which people communicate on the Internet. Even without knowing the details of the secret court fight, this represents an ominous expansion of 702's scope, which the committee introduced without any explanation or debate of its necessity. 

By contrast, the House Judiciary Committee bill, H.R. 6570, the Protect Liberty and End Warrantless Surveillance Act, would actually address a major problem with Section 702 by banning warrantless backdoor searches of Section 702 databases for Americans’ communications. This bill would also prohibit law enforcement from purchasing Americans’ data that they would otherwise need a warrant to obtain, a practice that circumvents core constitutional protections. Importantly, this bill would also renew this authority for only three more years, giving Congress another opportunity to revisit how the reforms are implemented and to make further changes if the government is still abusing the program.

EFF has long fought for significant changes to Section 702. By the government’s own numbers, violations are still occurring at a rate of more than 4,000 per year. Our government, with the FBI in the lead, has come to treat Section 702—enacted by Congress for the surveillance of foreigners on foreign soil —as a domestic surveillance program of Americans. This simply cannot be allowed to continue. While we will continue to push for further reforms to Section 702, we urge all members to reject the HPSCI bill.

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TELL congress: Defeat this bad 702 Bill

Both congressional intelligence committees have now released proposals for reauthorizing the government's Section 702 spying powers, largely as-is, and in the face of repeated abuse. 

The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) in the U.S. House of Representatives released a Nov. 16 report calling for reauthorization, which includes an outline of the legislation to do so. According to the report, the bill would renew the mass surveillance authority Section 702 and, in the process, invokes a litany of old boogeymen to justify why the program should continue to collect U.S. persons’ communications when they talk with people abroad.

As a reminder, the program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government intercepts and retains a massive trove of communications between Americans and people overseas. Increasingly, it’s this U.S. side of digital conversations that domestic law enforcement agencies trawl through—all without a warrant.

Private communications are the cornerstone of a free society.

It’s an old tactic. People in the intelligence community chafe against any proposals that would cut back on their “collect it all” mentality. This leads them to make a habit of finding the most current threat to public safety in order scare the public into pushing for much needed reforms, with terrorism serving as the most consistent justification for mass surveillance. In this document, HPSCI mentions that Section 702 could be the key to fighting: ISIS, Al-Qaeda, MS-13, and fentanyl trafficking. They hope that one, or all, of these threats will resonate with people enough to make them forget that the government has an obligation to honor the privacy of Americans communications and prevent them from being collected and hoarded by spy agencies and law enforcement.

The House Report

While we are still waiting for the official text, this House report proposes that Section 702 authorities be expanded to include “new provisions that make our nation more secure.” For example, the proposal may authorize the use of this unaccountable and out-of-control mass surveillance program as a new way of vetting asylum seekers by, presumably, sifting through their digital communications. According to a newly released Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) opinion, the government has sought some version of this authority for years, was repeatedly rejected, and received court approval for the first time this year. Because the court opinion is so heavily redacted, it is impossible to know the current scope of immigration- and visa-related querying, or what broader proposal the intelligence agencies originally sought. It’s possible the forthcoming proposal seeks to undo even the modest limitations that the FISC imposes on the government.

This new authority might give immigration services the ability to audit entire communication histories before deciding whether an immigrant can enter the country. This is a particularly problematic situation that could cost someone entrance to the United States based on, for instance, their own or a friend’s political opinions—as happened to a Palestinian Harvard student when his social media account was reviewed when coming to the U.S. to start his semester.

The House report’s bill outline also includes a call “to define Electronic Communication Service Provider to include equipment.” A 2023 FISC of Review opinion refused the intelligence community’s request for a novel interpretation of whether an entity was “an electronic communication service provider,” but that opinion is so heavily redacted that we don’t know what was so controversial. This crucial definition determines who may be compelled to turn over users’ personal information to the government so changes would likely have far-reaching impacts.

The Senate Bill

Not wanting to be outdone, this week the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence proposed a bill that would renew the surveillance power for 12 years—until 2035. Congress has previously insisted on sunsets of post-9/11 surveillance authorities every four to six years. These sunsets drive oversight and public discussion, forcing transparency that might not otherwise exist. And over the last two decades, periodic reauthorizations represent the only times that any statutory limitations have been put on FISA and similar authorities. Despite the veil of secrecy around Section 702, intelligence agencies are reliably caught breaking the law every couple of years, so a 12-year extension is simply a non-starter.

The SSCI bill also fails to include a warrant requirement for US person queries of 702 data—something that has been endorsed by dozens of nonprofit organizations and independent oversight bodies like the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. Something that everyone outside of the intelligence community considers common sense should be table stakes for any legislation.

Private communications are the cornerstone of a free society. That’s why EFF and a coalition of other civil right, civil liberties, and racial justice organizations have been fighting to seriously reform Section 702 otherwise let it expire when it sunsets at the end of 2023. One hopeful alternative has emerged: the Government Surveillance Reform Act, a bill that would make some much needed changes to Section 702 and which has earned our endorsement. Unlike either of these proposals, the GSRA would require court approval of government queries for Americans’ communications in Section 702 databases, allows Americans who have suffered injuries from Section 702 surveillance to use the evidentiary provisions FISA sets forth, and strengthens the government’s duties to provide notice when using data resulting from Section 702 surveillance in criminal prosecutions must serve as priorities for Congress as it considers reauthorizing Section 702.

Section 702 is the controversial and much-abused mass surveillance authority that expires in December unless Congress renews it. EFF and others have been working hard to get real reforms into the law and have opposed a renewal, and now, we’re hearing about a rushed attempt to tie renewal to funding the government. We need to stop it.

In September, President Biden signed a short-term continuing resolution to fund the government preventing a full shutdown. This week Congress must pass another bill to make sure it doesn’t happen again. But this time, we understand that Congress wants to vote on a "clean" renewal of Section 702—essentially, kicking the can down the road, as they've done before.

The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between Americans and people overseas. Increasingly, it’s this U.S. side of digital conversations that domestic law enforcement agencies trawl through—all without a warrant.

This is not how the government should work. Lawmakers should not take an unpopular, contested, and dangerous piece of legislation and slip it into a massive bill that, if opposed, would shut down the entire government. No one should have to choose between funding the government and renewing a dangerous mass surveillance program that even the federal government admits is in need of reform. 

EFF has signed onto a letter with a dozen organizations opposing even a short-term reauthorization of a program as dangerous as 702 in a piece of vital legislation. The letter says:

“In its current form, this authority is dangerous to our liberties and our democracy, and it should not be renewed for any length of time without robust debate, an opportunity for amendment, and — ultimately — far-reaching reforms. Allowing a short-term reauthorization to be slipped into a must-pass bill would demonstrate a blatant disregard for the civil liberties and civil rights of the American people.”

For months, EFF and a large coalition of civil rights, civil liberties, and racial justice groups have been fighting the renewal of Section 702. Just last week, a group of privacy-minded Senators and Representatives introduced the Government Surveillance Reform Act, which would introduce some much-needed safeguards and oversight onto a historically out-of-control surveillance program. Section 702 is far too powerful, invasive, and dangerous to renew it cleanly as a matter of bureaucratic necessity and we say that it has to be renewed with massive reforms or not at all. Sneaking something this important into a massive must-pass bill is dishonest and a slap in the face to all people who care about privacy and the integrity of our digital communications. 

With Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) set to expire at the end of the year, Congress is considering whether to reauthorize the law and if so, whether to make any necessary amendments to the invasive surveillance authority. 

While Section 702 was first sold as a tool necessary to stop foreign terrorists, it has since become clear that the government uses the communications it collects under this law as a domestic intelligence source. The program was intended to collect communications of people outside of the United States, but because we live in an increasingly globalized world, the government retains a massive trove of communications between people overseas on U.S. persons. Increasingly, it’s this U.S. side of digital conversations that are being routinely sifted through by domestic law enforcement agencies—all without a warrant. 

The congressional authorization for Section 702 expires in December 2023, and it’s in light of the current administration’s attempts to renew this authority that we demand that Congress must not reauthorize Section 702 without reforms. It’s more necessary than ever to pass reforms that prevent longstanding and widespread abuses of the program and that advance due process for everyone who communicates online.

U.S. Senators Ron Wyden, and Sen. Mike Lee, with cosponsors Senators Tammy Baldwin, Steve Daines, Mazie Hirono, Cynthia Lummis, Jon Tester, Elizabeth Warren, and Edward Markey, along with Representatives Zoe Lofren, Warren Davidson have introduced the Government Surveillance Reform Act that would reauthorize Section 702 with many of these important safeguards in place.

EFF supports this bill and encourages Congress to implement these critical measures:

Government Queries of Section 702 Databases

Under the Fourth Amendment, when the FBI or other law enforcement entity wants to search your emails, it must convince a judge there’s reason to believe your emails will contain evidence of a crime. But because of the way the NSA implements Section 702, communications from innocent Americans are routinely collected and stored in government databases, which are accessible to the FBI, the CIA, and the National Counterterrorism Center.

So instead of having to get a warrant to collect this data, it’s already in government servers. And the government currently decides for itself whether it can look through (“query”) its databases for Americans’ communications—decisions which it regularly makes incorrectly, even according to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. Requiring a judge to examine the government’s claims when it wants to query its Section 702 databases for Americans’ communications isn’t just a matter of standards: it’s about ensuring government officials don’t get to decide themselves whether they can compromise Americans’ privacy in their most sensitive and intimate communications.

The Government Surveillance Reform Act would prohibit warrantless queries of information collected under Section 702 to find communications or certain information of or about U.S. persons or persons located in the United States. Importantly, this prohibition would also include geolocation information, web browsing, and internet search history.

Holding the Government Accountable

A cornerstone of our legal system is that if someone—including the government—violates your rights, you can use the courts to hold them accountable if you can show that you were affected, i.e. that you have standing.

But, in multiple cases, courts interpreting an evidentiary provision in FISA have prevented Americans who alleged injuries from Section 702 surveillance from obtaining judicial review of the surveillance’s legality. The effect is a one-way ratchet that has “created a broad national-security exception to the Constitution that allows all Americans to be spied upon by their government while denying them any viable means of challenging that spying.”

Section 210 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act would change this. This provision says that if a U.S. person has a reasonable basis to believe that their rights have been, are being, or imminently will be violated, they have suffered an “injury in fact” and they have standing to bring their case. It also clarifies that courts should follow FISA’s provision for introducing and weighing evidence of surveillance. These are critical protections in preventing government overreach, and Congress should not reauthorize Section 702 without this provision.

Criminal Notice

Another important safeguard in the American legal system is the right of defendants in criminal cases to know how the evidence against them was obtained and to challenge the legality of how it was collected.

Under FISA as written, the government must disclose when it intends to use evidence it has collected under Section 702 in criminal prosecutions. But in the fifteen years since Congress enacted Section 702, the government has only provided notice to eleven criminal defendants of such intent—and has provided notice to zero defendants in the last five years.

Section 204 of the Government Surveillance Reform Act would clarify that the government is required to notify defendants whenever it would not have had any evidence “but for” Section 702 or other FISA surveillance. This is a common-sense rule, and Congress cannot reauthorize Section 702 without clarifying the government’s duty to disclose evidence collected under Section 702.

Government Surveillance Reform Act

Section 702 expires in December 2023, and Congress should not renew this program without serious consideration of the past abuses of the program and without writing in robust safeguards.

EFF applauds the Government Surveillance Reform Act, which recognizes the need to make these vital reforms, and many more, to Section 702. Requiring court approval of government queries for Americans’ communications in Section 702 databases, allowing Americans who have suffered injuries from Section 702 surveillance to use the evidentiary provisions FISA sets forth, and strengthening the government’s duties to provide notice when using data resulting from Section 702 surveillance in criminal prosecutions must serve as priorities for Congress as it considers reauthorizing Section 702.

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TELL congress: End 702 Absent serious reforms

The Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) has released its much-anticipated report on Section 702, a legal authority that allows the government to collect a massive amount of digital communications around the world and in the U.S. The PCLOB agreed with EFF and organizations across the political spectrum that the program requires significant reforms if it is to be renewed before its December 31, 2023 expiration. Of course, EFF believes that Congress should go further–including letting the program expire–in order to restore the privacy being denied to anyone whose communications cross international boundaries. 

PCLOB is an organization within the federal government appointed to monitor the impact of national security and law enforcement programs and techniques on civil liberties and privacy. Despite this mandate, the board has a history of tipping the scales in favor of the privacy annihilating status quo. This history is exactly why the recommendations in their new report are such a big deal: the report says Congress should require individualized authorization from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) for any searches of 702 databases for U.S. persons. Oversight, even by the secretive FISC, would be a departure from the current system, in which the Federal Bureau of Investigation can, without warrant or oversight, search for communications to or from anyone of the millions of people in the United States whose communications have been  vacuumed up by the mass surveillance program.

The report also recommends a permanent end to the legal authority that allows “abouts” collection, a search that allows the government to look at digital communications between two “non-targets”–people who are not the subject of the investigation–as long as they are talking “about” a specific individual.  The Intelligence Community voluntarily ceased this collection after increasing skepticism about its legality from the FISC. We agree with the PCLOB that it’s time to put the final nail in the coffin of this unconstitutional mass collection. 

Section 702 allows the National Security Agency to collect communications from all over the world. Although the authority supposedly prohibits targeting people on U.S. soil, people in the United States communicate with people overseas all the time and routinely have their communications collected and stored under this program. This results in a huge pool of what the government calls “incidentally” collected communications from Americans which the FBI and other federal law enforcement organizations eagerly exploit by searching without a warrant. These unconstitutional “backdoor” searches have happened millions of times and have continued despite a number of attempts by courts and Congress to rein in the illegal practice.

Along with over a dozen organizations, including ACLU, Center for Democracy in Technology, Demand Progress, Freedom of the Press Foundation, Project on Government Oversight, Brennan Center, EFF lent its voice to the request that the following reforms be the bare minimum for precondition for any re-authorization of Section 702: 

• Requiring the government to obtain a warrant before searching the content of Americans’ communications collected under intelligence authorities;
  
• Establishing legislative safeguards for surveillance affecting Americans that is conducted overseas under Executive Order 12333–an authority that raises many of the same concerns as Section 702, as previously noted by PCLOB members;
  
• Closing the data broker loophole, through which intelligence and law enforcement agencies purchase Americans’ sensitive location, internet, and other data without any legal process or accountability;
  
• Bolstering judicial review in FISA-related proceedings, including by shoring up the government’s obligation to give notice when information derived from FISA is used against a person accused of a crime; and
  
• Codifying reasonable limits on the scope of intelligence surveillance.
  

Use this handy tool to tell your elected officials: No reauthorization of 702 without drastic reform:

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TELL congress: End 702 Absent serious reforms

In the beloved episodic television shows of yesteryear, the antagonists were often “monsters of the week”: villains who would show up for one episode and get vanquished by the heroes just in time for them to fight the new monster in the following episode. Keeping up with the Intelligence Community and law enforcement’s justifications for invasive, secretive, and uncontrollable surveillance powers and authorities is a bit like watching  one of these shows. This week, they could say they need it to fight drugs or other cross-border contraband. Next week, they might need it to fight international polluters or revert to the tried-and-true national security justifications. The fight over the December 31, 2023 expiration of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act is no exception to the Monster of the Week phenomenon.

Section 702 is a surveillance authority that allows the National Security Agency to collect communications from all over the world. Although the authority supposedly prohibits targeting people on U.S. soil, people in the United States communicate with people overseas all the time and routinely have their communications collected and stored under this program. This results in a huge pool of “incidentally” collected communications from Americans which the Federal Bureau of Investigation eagerly exploits by searching through without a warrant. These unconstitutional “backdoor” searches have happened millions of times and have continued despite a number of attempts by courts and Congress to rein in the illegal practice.

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TELL congress: End 702 Absent serious reforms

Now, Section 702 is set to expire at the end of December. The Biden administration and intelligence community, eager to renew their embattled and unpopular surveillance powers, is searching for whatever sufficiently important policy concern that’s in the news—no matter how disconnected from Section 702’s original purpose—might convince  lawmakers to let them keep all their invasive tools. Justifying the continuation of Section 702 could take the form of vetting immigrants, stopping drug trafficking, or the original and most tried-and-true justification: national security. As the National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan wrote in July 2023, “Thanks to intelligence obtained under this authority, the United States has been able to understand and respond to threats posed by the People’s Republic of China, rally the world against Russian atrocities in Ukraine, locate and eliminate terrorists intent on causing harm to America, enable the disruption of fentanyl trafficking, mitigate the Colonial Pipeline ransomware attack, and much more.” Searching for the monster-du-jour that will scare the public into once again ceding their constitutional right to private communications is what the Intelligence Community does, and has done, for decades.

Fentanyl may be the IC’s current nemesis, but the argumentation behind it is weak. As one recent op-ed in the Hill noted, “Commonsense reforms to protect Americans’ privacy would not make the law less effective in addressing international drug trafficking or other foreign threats. To the contrary, it is the administration’s own intransigence on such reforms that has put reauthorization at risk.”

Since even before 2001, citing the need for new surveillance powers in order to secure the homeland has been a nearly foolproof way of silencing dissenters and creating hard-to-counter arguments for enhanced authorities. These surveillance programs are then so shrouded in secrecy that it becomes impossible to know how they’re being used, if they’re effective, or whether they’ve been abused.

With the pressure to renew Section 702 looming, we know the White House is feeling the pressure of our campaign to restore the privacy of our communications. No matter what bogeyman they present to us to justify its clean renewal, we have to keep the pressure up. You can use this easy tool to contact your members of Congress and tell them: absent major reforms, let 702 expire!

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TELL congress: End 702 Absent serious reforms